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Religious Organizations and Free Exercise:
The Surprising Lessons of Smith
Kathleen A. Brady ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the protections afforded by the
Free Exercise Clause when government regulation impacts the
religious practices of individuals, and if one looks for guidance from
the Supreme Court, the rules are fairly clear. Government action
designed to thwart religious exercise is, of course, unconstitutional.1
A more difficult issue arises when the state does not intend to
burden religious exercise but does so inadvertently. Prior to 1990,
the Supreme Court had long employed a balancing approach that
afforded significant relief. Under this approach, developed in the
seminal case Sherbert v. Verner,2 individuals were entitled to
exemptions from laws that substantially burdened religious conduct
unless enforcement was justified by a compelling state interest.3 In
1990, in Employment Division v. Smith,4 the Supreme Court
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. J.D., 1994, Yale Law
School; M.A.R., 1991, Yale Divinity School; B.A., 1989, Yale College. My thanks to Fred
Gedicks for the opportunity to participate in BYU Law School’s conference on church
autonomy, to others who organized and participated in the conference, and to my
commentators, Larry Sager and Laura Underkuffler, for their excellent feedback.
1. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523, 532–
33 (1993); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
2. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3. The Court applied this approach in numerous cases. See, e.g., Hernandez v.
Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S.
136, 141–42 (1987); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707, 717–19 (1981); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)
(“[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”). During this period, the Supreme Court
applied an approach more deferential to the government in the context of the military, see
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), and prisons, see O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342 (1987). In addition, free exercise protections were not available where the relief sought by
the claimant would have required the government to change the way it managed its own
internal affairs. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 448–
49 (1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699–700 (1986).
4. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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abandoned this balancing test for all but a few categories of cases.5
Under the Court’s new rule, the Free Exercise Clause does not
excuse individuals from compliance with neutral, generally applicable
laws that are not intended to burden religious exercise.6 Scholarly
writing addressing the proper scope of free exercise protections for
individuals has been extensive, and even more than a decade after
Smith, individual free exercise rights remain a familiar subject in the
academic literature.7
The scholarly and judicial landscape is much different when one
turns to the free exercise rights of religious organizations. Just as in
the case of individuals, government regulation frequently impacts the
activities of religious groups. For example, common areas of
litigation include: the application of federal antidiscrimination
statutes to employment decisions;8 the imposition of mandatory
collective bargaining requirements under state and federal labor
laws;9 the application of state licensing, teacher certification and

5. The balancing test still applies to “hybrid situations” involving free exercise claims in
conjunction with other constitutional rights. See id. at 881–82.
6. Id. at 878–79.
7. For a sampling of influential articles, see Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G.
Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious
Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free
Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 925 (2000) [hereinafter Gedicks, Defensible Free
Exercise Doctrine]; Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555 (1998) [hereinafter
Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation]; Marci A. Hamilton, Religion, the Rule of Law, and the Good
of the Whole: A View From the Clergy, 18 J.L. & POL. 387 (2002); Douglas Laycock, Religious
Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313 (1996) [hereinafter Laycock, Religious
Liberty as Liberty]; Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1
[hereinafter Laycock, Remnants of Free Exercise]; William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and
Free Exercise Revisionism, U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991) [hereinafter Marshall, In Defense of
Smith]; William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise
Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1989–90) [hereinafter Marshall, The Case Against];
Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of
Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter McConnell, Singling Out
Religion]; Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591 (1990). For historical analyses, see Michael W. McConnell,
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1409 (1990); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992).
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part II.B.
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curriculum requirements to church-operated schools;10 zoning and
historic preservation regulation;11 and the licensing and regulation of
religiously affiliated social services programs.12 However, while
clashes between churches13 and regulators are recurring, one finds
fewer scholarly works addressing the free exercise rights of religious
groups and much less guidance from the Supreme Court. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has, surprisingly, never directly addressed the
scope of free exercise protections when government regulation
interferes with the internal affairs of religious groups. The Court has
addressed claims for tax exemptions,14 but none of these cases has
involved government action that directly impinges on internal
church operations.
While no case has addressed this issue directly, Supreme Court
precedents involving religious groups provide support for three very
different approaches.15 On the one hand, there is some support for a
broad right of “church autonomy”16 that prohibits government
interference with internal church affairs regardless of whether the
activities affected are religious in nature or more mundane
administrative matters. On the other hand, Supreme Court decisions
also support an approach that mirrors Smith’s rule for individuals.
When government action is neutral and generally applicable,
religious groups are not entitled to special relief even if the
regulation burdens religious practices. In between these two options,
a third approach provides limited relief where government regulation

10. See, e.g., Johnson v. Charles City Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 368 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa
1985); State ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 1981); State v.
Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976).
11. See, e.g., St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.
1990); Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982); Soc’y of Jesus v.
Boston Landmarks Comm’n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990); First Covenant Church v. City of
Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
12. For a discussion of cases in this area, see Carl H. Esbeck, Government Regulation of
Religiously Based Social Services: The First Amendment Considerations, 19 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 343 (1992).
13. I use the term “church” broadly to refer to both Christian groups as well as nonChristian organizations.
14. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
15. See infra Part II.
16. Douglas Laycock popularized the use of this term in his influential piece, Towards a
General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to
Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
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impinges on religious practice or activity. Under this middle
position, religious organizations do not have a broad right of
autonomy over all internal affairs, but they are entitled to exemptions
from laws that burden religious practice. Each of these approaches
can be found in lower court decisions, and each has its supporters in
the legal academy.
This Article examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith for
guidance in choosing among these three options. The use of Smith
as a prism through which to analyze the free exercise rights of
religious groups makes sense for several reasons. First, no satisfactory
account of religious group rights can be developed without
evaluating the ramifications of Smith. While Smith dealt with
protections for individuals, courts and scholars know that they must
wrestle with the meaning of Smith in the group context. For some
courts and scholars, the meaning of Smith for religious groups is
simple: religious groups, just like religious individuals, are not
entitled to special exemptions from neutral state action. For others,
however, Smith is not relevant at all to the free exercise rights of
religious groups, and they look to other lines of Supreme Court
precedent for appropriate standards. My examination of Smith
reveals that Smith is not only relevant to an analysis of religious
group rights but is also very helpful for choosing among the three
options outlined above. The opinion of the Court in Smith raises a
number of issues that clarify what is at stake in making this choice,
and its lessons are surprising. When read carefully, Smith supports a
broad right of church autonomy that extends to all aspects of church
affairs, the most religiously sensitive as well as the more mundane.
II. THREE POSSIBLE APPROACHES
While the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
protections afforded by the Free Exercise Clause when government
regulation interferes with church affairs, a number of the Court’s
decisions provide guidance. The earliest source of guidance is a series
of cases regarding intrachurch disputes over property.17 These
17. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for
the United States and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Md. and Va. Eldership of
the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367 (1970); Presbyterian
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440 (1969); Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952);
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decisions span over one hundred years, and within them, one finds
arguments for all three approaches to religious group rights outlined
above. Several other Supreme Court cases also bear on this issue, and
they too have left the choice between these approaches unresolved.
In this section, I will examine these Supreme Court decisions and the
support they provide for each of these approaches. I will then
examine two lines of lower court cases that reflect these different
possibilities, and I will observe the same split among legal scholars.
A. Supreme Court Case Law
The first time that the Supreme Court addressed an intrachurch
dispute over property was in Watson v. Jones,18 decided in 1872. The
litigation in Watson arose when divisions over slavery and loyalty to
the federal government resulted in a schism within the Presbyterian
Church in the United States after the Civil War.19 The General
Assembly, which functions as the highest judicatory in Presbyterian
polity, had supported the union and opposed slavery; after the war
ended, the General Assembly sought to enforce these views among
church members.20 The General Assembly’s policy resulted in a split
that affected the local congregation of the Walnut Street Church in
Louisville, Kentucky.21 As the congregation’s members divided over
support for the General Assembly, both factions claimed ownership
of the church’s property.22 One of the factions sued in federal court
based on diversity of citizenship, and on appeal, the Supreme Court
applied federal common law. While Watson long antedated the
Court’s application of the First Amendment to the states, the Court
was guided by what it described as “a broad and sound view of the
relations between church and state under our system of laws.”23
According to the Court, in America, “[t]he law knows no heresy,
and is committed to the support of no dogma,”24 and individuals
have the right to form voluntary religious associations for the
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Bouldin v. Alexander,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
18. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
19. See id. at 690–93.
20. See id. at 690–91.
21. See id. at 692.
22. See id. at 692–93.
23. Id. at 727.
24. Id. at 728.
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expression, practice, and dissemination of any religious doctrine that
does not violate “the laws of morality or property” or “infringe
personal rights.”25 This freedom includes the right to create church
tribunals for the resolution of contested questions,26 and when
church members form a hierarchical polity, courts must defer to the
highest of these tribunals on “questions of discipline, or of faith, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law” when disputes arise.27 Applying
this rule, the Court held that the property of the Walnut Street
Church belonged to the faction loyal to the General Assembly.28
The Court gave several reasons for its rule. First, when
individuals join together to form churches with hierarchical forms of
governance, they voluntarily agree to submit to the decisions of
church tribunals on disputed questions.29 When courts defer to the
highest judicatory of a hierarchical polity, they are deferring to the
choice made by church members. Second, deference also respects the
proper boundaries between church and state. Quoting with approval
the opinion of a South Carolina court, the Watson justices stated:
“The structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil
liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference.
On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion
of the civil authority.”30 Finally, the Court observed that civil courts
are “incompetent judges”31 of the intricacies of church teaching.32 If
courts become embroiled in questions of faith and doctrine, they will
“involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty.”33
Within the Watson opinion, one can find support for all three
approaches to government regulation of church affairs discussed
above. One may argue, for instance, that the right to form voluntary
religious associations and to determine rules for church governance
requires broad protection from neutral government regulation as
well as judicial deference in religious controversies. Whenever state
25. Id. at 728–29.
26. Id. at 729.
27. Id. at 727.
28. See id. at 734.
29. Id. at 729.
30. Id. at 730 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harmon v. Dreher, 17
S.C.Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87 (S.C. App. Eq. 1843)).
31. Id. at 732 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting German Reformed Church
v. Commonwealth ex rel. Seibert, 3 Pa. 282 (1846)).
32. See id. at 729, 732.
33. Id. at 732.
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laws interfere with church control over internal affairs, they infringe
on this freedom. Indeed, as Professor Laycock has noted,
government regulation “is in some ways a greater intrusion” on the
church than judicial resolution of disputes because “regulation
always imposes external rules.”34 A system of government that gives
individuals the right to form religious associations, no matter how
unorthodox, places church affairs beyond the competence of
government. A broad right of church autonomy also best accords
with the separationist views regarding church and state expressed in
Watson. When the Court affirmed that in America, “religious liberty
[is secured] from the invasion of the civil authority,”35 the justices
were envisioning a sphere of institutional autonomy beyond the
power of the state.
A less expansive view of religious group rights is also consistent
with the reasoning in Watson. When Watson requires judicial
deference on contested “questions of discipline, or of faith, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law,”36 it may, indeed, require relief
from government regulation that affects religious beliefs and
practices, but such relief need not extend to matters that lack
ecclesiastical or religious significance. If, for example, state regulation
only affects secular aspects of church operations, religious freedom is
not at issue and Watson has nothing to say. Moreover, a broad right
of autonomy that extends to all aspects of church administration
regardless of whether religious matters are implicated would be
gratuitous favoritism that no other type of nonprofit or charitable
organization enjoys. Watson supports limited protection when
government regulation interferes with ecclesiastical matters or
conflicts with church doctrine, but it does not support a broader
right of church autonomy.
The Watson opinion supports yet a third interpretation. Watson
is a decision about the limitations of judicial review in cases of
intrachurch controversies. It is not a case about neutral government
regulation, and it does not require special protections for religious
groups even when the state interferes with religious beliefs or
practice. When courts address intrachurch disputes over property,

34. Laycock, supra note 16, at 1396.
35. Watson, 80 U.S. at 730 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harmon v.
Dreher, 17 S.C.Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87 (S.C. App. Eq. 1843)).
36. Id. at 727.
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they seek a peaceful resolution of the controversy that accords with
the expectations of church members, and, thus, deference to the
highest church tribunal in hierarchical polities makes sense. In this
respect, the decision in Watson was not novel, nor were its
underlying principles appropriate solely for religious organizations.
Indeed, the Watson majority specifically stated at the outset of its
opinion that it would be applying general principles applicable to all
voluntary charitable associations.37
In cases involving neutral government regulation, additional
state interests are at stake. When the government regulates, it does
so to achieve legitimate, and often pressing, policy objectives. Special
exemptions for religious organizations would undermine these
objectives. Moreover, neutral government regulation of church
affairs does not infringe the freedoms protected in Watson. The
Court in Watson affirms the right of individuals to join together in
religious associations and to create tribunals to settle contested
questions of faith and doctrine. When the government imposes
neutral regulation, rather than engages in the resolution of internal
disputes, these tribunals have no role to play. Moreover, the freedom
to determine internal church structures and governance does not
imply a right to exemption from external rules that are the result of
democratic decision making and that apply equally to all similarly
situated associations.
Subsequent intrachurch dispute decisions also support these
multiple interpretations. In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the
Russian Orthodox Church in North America,38 decided eighty years
after Watson, the Court used some of its broadest language
describing religious group rights. The Kedroff Court found in
Watson “a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an
independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power
to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”39
According to Kedroff, this freedom has constitutional protection
under the Free Exercise Clause.40 The Court expressly approved of
Watson’s rule of deference in cases of internal church disputes41 and
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

1640
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344 U.S. 94 (1952).
Id. at 116.
See id. at 115–16.
See id. at 110–16, 120–21.
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affirmed as well a “rule of separation between church and state.”42
Drawing upon this separationist view, the Court identified a
“[f]reedom to select . . . clergy”43 and an “ecclesiastical right [to] . . .
choice of . . . hierarchy.”44 In addition, the Court spoke of
protections for “church administration,”45 the “operation of . . .
churches,”46 and “polity.”47 Thus, the Court seemed to come close
to embracing a broad right of church autonomy over internal church
administration and governance.
The holding in Kedroff is, however, limited. The litigation in
Kedroff concerned the right to occupy a Russian Orthodox cathedral
in New York.48 After the Russian Revolution, the New York
legislature had transferred control of the property from the central
governing authority of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow to
church authorities in America.49 The Kedroff Court held that the
transfer of power from one church authority to another violated the
First Amendment.50 Clearly, the Kedroff Court believed that
intentional interference with church government is unconstitutional.
However, Kedroff did not address neutral government regulation
that inadvertently interferes with church administration. Moreover, it
is not clear from the Court’s opinion how far the independence that
it envisioned should extend. Protected aspects of church affairs
include the choice of clergy and hierarchy, and other “matters strictly
ecclesiastical,”51 but whether more mundane aspects of church
governance receive similar protection is left unresolved.
These ambiguities remain in more recent decisions. For example,
in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada
v. Milivojevich,52 the Court held that courts must defer to church
tribunals on matters of polity and administration as well as faith and
doctrine.53 However, like Kedroff, this case involved an intrachurch
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 110.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 107, 117.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 95–97.
Id. at 97–99, 105–07.
Id. at 110, 119.
Id. at 119.
426 U.S. 696 (1976).
Id. at 710.
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dispute, not neutral government regulation, and the scope of
protected matters of church government is unclear. Milivojevich
involved “quintessentially religious controversies” over church
discipline and the choice of clergy,54 as well as diocesan
reorganization, an “issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs.”55 For
matters involving less sensitive issues, the scope of First Amendment
protection remains uncertain.
The Court’s most recent intrachurch dispute case marks a
substantial shift in the Court’s treatment of church controversies, but
the same ambiguities remain. In Jones v. Wolf,56 decided in 1979, the
Court held that courts may, but need not, employ the rule of
deference developed in Watson. Instead of automatically deferring to
the decision of the highest tribunal in hierarchical polities, courts
may use “neutral principles of law” to resolve the dispute, or any
other approach that does not require consideration of religious
questions.57 Under the neutral-principles approach, courts use
secular principles of property and trust law to examine the language
of deeds, church charters or constitutions, state statutes, and any
other relevant documents.58 Only when the interpretation of these
documents would require courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions
must courts defer to the decisions of religious bodies.59 The
advantage of this approach is that it “free[s] civil courts completely
from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and
practice.”60
At first glance, the Court’s decision in Wolf seems to undermine
the free exercise protections established in earlier cases. In Wolf, the
Court’s priority appears to be avoiding judicial entanglement in
religious questions. As long as there is no danger that courts will
become embroiled in doctrinal issues, the Court indicates that any
one of a number of approaches to intrachurch disputes may be
54. Id. at 720; see also id. at 717 (“Nor is there any dispute that questions of church
discipline and the composition of the church hierarchy are at the core of ecclesiastical concern
. . . .”).
55. Id. at 721.
56. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
57. Id. at 602.
58. Id. at 600–04.
59. Id. at 604.
60. Id. at 603; see also id. at 605 (“The neutral-principles approach . . . obviates entirely
the need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling church
property disputes.”).
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permissible.61 The dissent in Wolf observes that applying neutral
principles of law, or another of these permissible approaches, may
well result in overturning the decision of church hierarchies.62
According to the dissent, such an outcome would interfere with the
free exercise of religion.63 In the view of many scholars, the lesson for
church organizations facing neutral government regulation is that
such regulation will be sustained as long as its application does not
require the examination of religious questions.64 Because neutral
regulations are, by definition, secular standards, such entanglement
will not occur often. Churches do not have an independent right to
be free from government interference that does not involve state
bodies in religious matters.
A second look at Wolf, however, reveals other possible
interpretations of the majority’s decision. The Court in Wolf was
careful to point out that the advantages of the neutral-principles
method are not limited to nonentanglement. The use of neutral
principles of law permits courts to avoid entanglement in
ecclesiastical questions while at the same time securing free exercise
values.65 Through appropriate use of secular language and property
concepts, religious organizations can specify the resolution they
would prefer in the event of a dispute.66 In this way, the neutralprinciples approach “can ensure that a dispute over the ownership of
church property will be resolved in accord with the desires of the
members.”67 While the dissent argues that the neutral-principles
method undermines free exercise rights, the majority insists that
“[n]othing could be further from the truth.”68 Thus, the majority’s
61. See id. at 602.
62. See id. at 613–14, 616 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 613–14, 616–17 & n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
64. See Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, The No-Harm Rule, and the Public
Good, 2004 BYU. L. REV. 1099; Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious
Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 406–08 (1987); see
also Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield Belongs to the Lord”: Religious Employers and a Constitutional
Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 294 (1994) (“Jones v. Wolf sharply
undermines any claim that the Free Exercise Clause confers a wide-ranging right of autonomy
upon religious organizations.”).
65. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603–04.
66. See id. at 603.
67. Id. at 604. Whether the neutral-principles approach will always work as envisioned
by the majority in Wolf has been questioned by Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off ! Civil Court
Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1881–86 (1998).
68. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 605–06.
.
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approval of the neutral-principles method arguably reflects a
continuing commitment to the free exercise rights of religious
organizations as well as entanglement concerns. Such a commitment
to free exercise is consistent with protections from neutral state
regulation as well, either in the form of a broad right of church
autonomy or more limited relief in situations where religious beliefs
or practices are burdened.
Indeed, in its earlier decision in Presbyterian Church in the
United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church,69 the Supreme Court indicated that avoidance of judicial
entanglement in religious doctrine itself serves free exercise values. In
Hull, decided ten years before Wolf, the Court suggested for the first
time that the use of neutral principles of law may be a permissible
method for resolving church property disputes.70 Just as in Wolf, the
Court in Hull appeared to give priority to entanglement concerns.71
However, the reason that the Court gave for these concerns reflects a
continuing commitment to free exercise. According to the Court, if
courts become involved in resolving religious questions, “the hazards
are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious
doctrine.”72 The Court repeated this statement in Milivojevich.73
Thus, it is, in part, free exercise values that demand
nonentanglement.
To the extent that other forms of government action, such as
neutral government regulation, also intrude upon the free
development of religious doctrine, the reasoning in Hull supports
additional relief. Indeed, the reasoning in Hull goes even further. In
Hull, the Court’s concerns were not limited to actual burdens on the
free development of religious doctrine. The Court was also
69. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
70. See id. at 449.
71. See id. at 445 (noting that the state has a legitimate interest in resolving church
property disputes but “[s]pecial problems arise . . . when these disputes implicate controversies
over church doctrine and practice”); id. at 447 (explaining that the logic of Watson “leaves the
civil courts no role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property
disputes”); id. at 449 (“First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property
litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious
doctrine and practice.”); id. (concluding that the First Amendment “commands civil courts to
decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious
doctrine”).
72. Id.
73. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Can. v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976).
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concerned with the “hazard” or danger of such interference. If the
danger of interference also raises First Amendment problems,
arguably only a broad right of church autonomy would provide
sufficient protection. Any time government regulation impacts
internal church affairs, there is a real danger that the development of
doctrine will be affected. Even where the regulation does not appear
to touch upon matters of religious belief or doctrine, these hazards
are present.
A handful of other Supreme Court cases that address protections
for religious organizations also lend support to the three approaches
to government regulation found within the Court’s intrachurch
dispute cases. For each approach, there is a decision that seems to
favor it. However, like the Court’s intrachurch dispute cases, none of
these decisions squarely addresses the free exercise rights of religious
groups.
For example, in 1979, the same year that Wolf was decided, the
Court seemed to approve a broad right of church autonomy in
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago.74 The litigation in Catholic
Bishop arose when unions of lay teachers at several Catholic
secondary schools sought to bargain collectively with their diocesan
employers under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).75 The
dioceses refused on the grounds that application of the Act would
impinge on their control over the religious mission of the schools
and, thus, violate the First Amendment.76 The Court agreed that
application of the Act would give rise to serious constitutional
questions.77 The Court identified the danger of entanglement in
religious matters and also stated that “mandatory collective
bargaining, regardless of how narrowly the scope of negotiation is
defined, necessarily represents an encroachment upon the former
autonomous position of management.”78 Whether the Court meant
to suggest that any government regulation that interferes with
internal church affairs raises First Amendment problems is unclear,
and the Court did not elaborate further upon this statement.
Following its statement, the Court did observe that ensuing conflicts
74. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
75. See id. at 492–95.
76. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1123 (7th Cir. 1977).
77. See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501–04.
78. Id. at 503 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pa. Labor Relations Bd. v.
State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 337 A.2d 262, 267 (Pa. 1975)).
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between clergy-administrators and the National Labor Relations
Board, and between administrators and union negotiators, would
further entangle religion and government.79 Thus, it is possible that
the Court simply meant that encroachment on church autonomy
would exacerbate entanglement problems rather than raise an
independent First Amendment problem. In any event, the Court in
Catholic Bishop ultimately sidestepped resolving any constitutional
questions and decided the case on statutory grounds. According to
the Court, in view of the serious constitutional questions it
identified, there must be a clear affirmative intent by Congress to
cover the teachers under the NLRA before the Court would
construe the Act to apply to them.80 Finding none, the Court
declined to construe the Act to cover them and avoided resolving the
First Amendment issues.81
In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools,82
the Supreme Court seemed to support a different approach. The
litigation in Dayton arose when Dayton Christian Schools
(“Dayton”) refused to renew the contract of a female teacher, Linda
Hoskinson, after learning that she had become pregnant.83 The
stated reason was that mothers should be at home when their
children are young.84 When Hoskinson threatened litigation based
on state and federal antidiscrimination laws, the school terminated
her because she failed to follow the “Biblical chain of command” in
seeking relief.85 Hoskinson then filed a complaint with the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission alleging gender discrimination in violation
of state law.86 The school filed an action in federal court seeking to
enjoin the administrative proceedings.87 The school argued that any
investigation of Hoskinson’s claim or imposition of sanctions would

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
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violate the First Amendment.88 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the
school and granted the injunction.89 The Supreme Court reversed.90
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dayton was based on
abstention grounds.91 According to the Court, Dayton will have an
adequate opportunity to raise any constitutional arguments in the
state proceedings.92 However, the Court also added that “however
Dayton’s constitutional claim should be decided on the merits, the
Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely investigating
the circumstances of Hoskinson’s discharge . . . if only to ascertain
whether the ascribed religious-based reason was in fact the reason for
the discharge.”93 By making this statement, the Court seems to
suggest that the outcome of Dayton’s constitutional claim may turn
on whether Dayton’s decision to discharge Hoskinson was, in fact,
religiously motivated or whether the professed religious reason was
merely pretextual. If the school’s reason for the discharge was
actually religious, constitutional relief might be appropriate, but if
the school’s decision was not religiously motivated, the Court
suggests that application of antidiscrimination statutes would be
permissible. An investigation into the school’s motive would not be
relevant if the Court believed that all regulation impinging upon
church control over internal operations were unconstitutional. Thus,
the Court seems to reject a broad right of church autonomy while it
leaves open the possibility of narrower protections where
government regulation interferes with religious belief and practice.
One must be careful, however, not to read too much into the
Court’s statement. The Court’s comment was brief and remains
dicta. By resting its holding on abstention grounds, the Court did
not resolve Dayton’s First Amendment claims. It is quite possible
that upon full consideration of the constitutional issues involved, the
Court would embrace broader protections than it seems to envision
here.

88.
89.
1985).
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 624–25.
Id. at 625. The Sixth Circuit’s decision can be found at 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir.
See Dayton, 477 U.S. at 622.
See id.
See id. at 628.
Id.
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In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,94 the Court again left the scope of free
exercise protections for religious organizations unresolved. At issue
in Amos was a provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
exempting religious organizations from the Act’s prohibition against
religious discrimination in employment.95 The exemption permits
religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion in
employment regardless of whether the employee engages in religious
functions.96 While Congress had originally exempted only the
organization’s religious activities, it broadened the exemption in
1972.97 This expanded exemption was challenged on Establishment
Clause grounds, and the Amos Court upheld the exemption for all
nonprofit activities.98 According to the Court, legislatures do not
violate the Establishment Clause by seeking to lift significant
regulatory burdens on the ability of religious groups to define and
carry out their religious missions.99 Even where it seems that only
secular activities are involved, “it is a significant burden on a religious
organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict
which of its activities a secular court will consider religious.”100 The
line between religious and secular activities is not clear, and an
organization would “understandably be concerned that a judge
would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission.”101
The resulting “[f]ear of potential liability might affect the way an
organization carried out what it understood to be its religious
mission.”102
The Amos Court conceived of burdens on religious belief and
practice broadly. Indirect interference with religious activity burdens
a group’s religious mission just as direct intrusion on religious
matters does. The Court also observed that the inability of judges to
fully understand different religious beliefs may limit their capacity to

94. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
95. See id. at 329–30. This exemption appears in section 702 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-1(a).
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
97. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 332 n.9.
98. See id. at 330, 339.
99. See id. at 335–39.
100. Id. at 336.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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identify burdens on religious activity, and the Court concluded that
broad legislative exemptions are permissible under the Establishment
Clause. However, the Court did not address the scope of mandatory
accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause; indeed, the Court
expressly left the scope of free exercise protection unresolved.103
Amos tells us what government may do to alleviate government
interference with religious groups, but it does not tell us what the
government must do.
For many commentators, the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith
provides the most relevant guidance when neutral government
regulation impacts the internal affairs of religious groups.104 Just as
individuals are no longer entitled to special exemptions when neutral
laws burden individual religious practice, religious groups also
receive no special protections. When read in conjunction with Jones
v. Wolf, Smith permits government regulation of churches where the
regulations are neutral and generally applicable and their application
would not entangle government bodies in religious questions.
However, while this interpretation of Smith is certainly plausible,
it is not the only possible reading, and the ambiguities discussed
above remain. Smith addressed the free exercise rights of individuals.
The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not “relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law
of general applicability.’”105 Under this reading, Smith simply did not
address the scope of free exercise protections for religious groups.
Thus, while Smith may mean a lot for religious group rights, it may
also mean little or nothing at all.
B. Lower Court Decisions
These multiple interpretations of Supreme Court precedent are
reflected in lower-court opinions. My discussion will focus on two
related lines of cases. One line addresses the constitutionality of
applying federal antidiscrimination statutes to the employment
decisions of religious organizations. The second addresses the
constitutionality of requiring religious organizations to bargain

103. See id. at 335–36.
104. See Brant, supra note 64, at 276–77, 280–81; Hamilton, supra note 64, at 1193–96.
105. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment)).

1649

1BRD-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/16/2004 12:33 PM

[2004

collectively under federal and state labor laws. I have chosen these
cases for several reasons. First, many of the important scholarly works
examining government regulation of religious groups have drawn
upon decisions in these areas to develop and illustrate their
arguments.106 Focusing on the same case law facilitates engagement
with these scholars. Second, these cases reflect the full range of
approaches to government regulation discussed above. Lower courts
usually choose one of the three approaches that can be found in
Supreme Court case law, and one can find lower-court cases
illustrating all three approaches.
Lower-court decisions addressing employment discrimination
statutes generally support relief where these laws impinge upon the
religious beliefs or practices of the organization. These cases usually
reject a broad right of church autonomy that would extend to all
aspects of church operations, and none favors the type of rule
developed in Smith for individuals. They agree that religious groups
are entitled to special protection under the Free Exercise Clause, but
only where religious matters are actually at stake.
Most lower-court litigation challenging the application of
employment discrimination laws to religious organizations involves
allegations of gender or race discrimination under Title VII or
allegations of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).107 While Congress has exempted religious
groups from prohibitions against religious discrimination in
106. See, e.g., Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical
Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979);
Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious
Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99; Laycock, supra
note 16; Lupu, supra note 64; Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious
Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002); William P. Marshall &
Douglas C. Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations Under the Establishment Clause, 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 293 (1986).
107. Cases have also involved claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, see Werft
v. Desert Southwest Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th
Cir. 2004); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999), the Equal Pay Act, see Dole v.
Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Fremont Christian
Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986), violations of the reporting requirements of Title VII, see
EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981), and
increasingly, sexual harassment suits under Title VII, see Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church,
375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940
(9th Cir. 1999); Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, No. CIV.A.03-2150-KHV, 2004 WL
2429978 (D. Kan. Oct. 28, 2004).
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employment,108 federal statutes contain no exemptions for
discrimination based on gender, race, age, or other factors unrelated
to religion. Because almost all lower courts to address the issue have
found that Congress expressed an affirmative intent to cover
religious organizations within these prohibitions,109 the courts have
been unable to avoid constitutional questions on statutory grounds,
as the Supreme Court did in Catholic Bishop.
Beginning with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in McClure v.
Salvation Army,110 lower federal courts have uniformly carved out
what has become known as the “ministerial exception” to
employment discrimination statutes.111 The McClure court describes
the relationship between a church and its minister as its

108. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (exempting religious organizations from Title VII’s
prohibition against religious discrimination in employment).
109. See, e.g., Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 331
(3d Cir. 1993); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172–73 (2d Cir. 1993);
Shenandoah, 899 F.2d at 1394–95; Fremont, 781 F.2d at 1365–66; Rayburn v. Gen.
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166–67 (4th Cir. 1985); EEOC v.
Pacific Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981).
The exception is the Fifth Circuit, which has held that “Congress did not intend,
through the nonspecific wording of the applicable provisions of Title VII, to regulate the
employment relationship between church and minister.” McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d
553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972). Later Fifth Circuit decisions have found that Congress intended
to cover other employment relationships within religious groups. See EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626
F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980). In Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals, 929
F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991), the Eighth Circuit assumed without deciding that Congress
intended coverage of religious institutions under the ADEA. Id. at 361 & n.2; cf. Weissman v.
Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 1041, 1045 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that
congressional intent to cover religious organizations under the ADEA is unclear, but
application of the Act to a temple administrator raises no serious constitutional questions).
110. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
111. For cases treating this exception, see Werft, 377 F.3d 1099; Elvig, 375 F.3d 951;
Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003); EEOC v.
Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); Gellington v. Christian
Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000); Starkman, 198 F.3d 173;
Bollard, 196 F.3d 940; Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist
Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir.
1994); Scharon, 929 F.2d 360; Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist
Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rayburn, 772 F.2d 1164; Pacific Press, 676 F.2d
1272; Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d 277; Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477; McClure, 460 F.2d 553;
Patsakis v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of Am., 339 F. Supp. 2d 686 (2004); Powell v.
Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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“lifeblood,”112 an area of “prime ecclesiastical concern,”113 and a
matter “both basic and traditional.”114 Later courts have described
this relationship as “close to the heart of church administration,”115 a
“critically sensitive position,”116 a “quintessentially religious”
matter,117 a “pervasively religious relationship,”118 and a “strictly
ecclesiastical matter[].”119 Employment decisions regarding clergy
are a “core matter of ecclesiastical self-governance with which the
state may not constitutionally interfere.”120 Lower courts also agree
that the ministerial exception applies even if there is no doctrinal
basis for the discrimination.121 As the Fourth Circuit stated in
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,122 in

112. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558; see also Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1304 (same); Bollard,
196 F.3d at 946 (same); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1357 (same).
113. McClure, 460 F.2d at 559; see also Minker, 894 F.2d at 1357 (same).
114. McClure, 460 F.2d at 559.
115. Whitney, 401 F. Supp. at 1368; see also Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946 (stating that the
ministerial relationship is “close to the heart of the church”); id. at 949 (“A religious
organization’s decision to employ or to terminate employment of a minister is at the heart of
its religious mission.”); Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1278 (stating that ministerial duties “go to
the heart of the church’s function”); McClure, 460 F.2d at 560 (stating that the minister is at
“the heart” of the church).
116. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1278; see also Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (explaining that
the church-minister relationship is a “sensitive area[]”).
117. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720
(1976)).
118. DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 171 (2d Cir. 1993); see also
Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir. 1994) (same).
119. Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th
Cir. 2000).
120. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946. The First Amendment is violated when government
“trespasses on the most spiritually intimate grounds of a religious community’s existence.”
EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 2000).
121. See e.g., Werft v. Desert Southwest Annual Conference of the United Methodist
Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi.,
320 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003); Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801; Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v.
Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 464–65 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Young v. N. Ill. Conference of
United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 186 (7th Cir. 1994); Minker v. Balt. Annual
Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rayburn,
772 F.2d at 1169.
122. 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985).
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“‘quintessentially religious’ matters, the free exercise clause . . .
protects the act of a decision rather than a motivation behind it.”123
No court has limited the ministerial exception to ordained
clergy. The exception covers all employees with ministerial
functions.124 The determination of which employees perform
ministerial functions has yielded more variation among the courts.
The proper inquiry has been described differently by different courts,
as some courts view ministerial functions more broadly than others.
For example, in two early cases, the Fifth Circuit employed a narrow
conception of clergy.125 The court described ministers as
intermediaries between the church and its congregation or
instructors in the “whole of religious doctrine.”126 More courts have
followed the broader definition suggested by Bruce Bagni, who has
identified ministers as those whose “primary duties consist of
teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a
religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and
worship.”127 According to these courts, this inquiry is designed to
“determine whether a position is important to the spiritual and
pastoral mission of the church.”128 In other cases, the test used to
determine who is a minister is much less clear.129

123. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (citation omitted). The court continued: “In these
sensitive areas, the state may no more require a minimum basis in doctrinal reasoning than it
may supervise doctrinal content.” Id.
124. See Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 703; Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801; Catholic Univ.,
83 F.3d at 461; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168.
125. See EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir.
1981); EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
126. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d at 485; Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283–85 (quoting and
drawing on Mississippi College).
127. Bagni, supra note 106, at 1545, quoted in Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801; Catholic Univ.,
83 F.3d at 461 (quoting Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; Powell v.
Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (D. Colo. 1994).
128. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801 (quoting Rayburn); Catholic
Univ., 83 F.3d at 461 (quoting Rayburn).
129. For example, in a recent opinion, the Ninth Circuit seemed to envision clergy
narrowly as those who are “representatives” of the church, Bollard v. Cal. Province of the
Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999), but the case did not require the court to
examine the functions of any lay employees. In another recent decision, the Fifth Circuit
employed a mélange of factors, including whether employment decisions are made largely on
religious criteria, whether the employee performs ceremonies of the church, and whether the
employee tends to the religious needs of the congregation. See Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d
173, 176–77 (5th Cir. 1999).
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Initially, courts based the ministerial exception on two grounds.
The first was the balancing approach that the Supreme Court applied
to individual free exercise claims prior to Smith. According to the
courts, interference with the choice of clergy heavily burdens
religious practice, and this burden is not justified by a sufficiently
compelling state interest.130 Furthermore, employment decisions
regarding clergy are quintessentially religious matters of church
government protected from state interference under the Court’s
intrachurch dispute decisions.131 Thus, the lower courts interpreted
the Court’s intrachurch dispute cases to provide relief where neutral
government regulation interferes with important religious aspects of
church affairs. After Smith, lower courts have continued to apply the
ministerial exception based on these intrachurch dispute cases.132
According to these courts, free exercise protections for individuals
and groups must be distinguished.133 Protections for individuals are
now governed by Smith and are limited. Individuals are not entitled
to exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws that burden
free exercise.134 However, in its intrachurch dispute precedent, the
Supreme Court has articulated a different basis for relief where
government interferes with the internal operations of churches.135
The courts emphasize the statement in Kedroff that churches have
the right “to decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine.”136
In addition to the ministerial exception, lower courts have also
acknowledged the possibility of relief where employment regulation
130. See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168–69; see also Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United
Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 185 (7th Cir. 1994) (approving Rayburn’s analysis).
131. See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167–68; Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 282; McClure
v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 359–60 (5th Cir. 1972).
132. See Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 800 n.*; Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal
Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2000); Bollard, 196 F.3d at 945–46; Combs v.
Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 348–50 (5th
Cir. 1999); Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 350–51.
133. See Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 800 n.*; Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303–04; Combs, 173
F.3d at 348–49; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 348, 350–51.
134. See Combs, 173 F.3d at 348–49; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 350.
135. See Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 800 n.*; Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303–04; Combs, 173
F.3d at 348–50; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 350–51.
136. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344
U.S. 94, 116 (1952), quoted in Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 800 n.*; Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303;
Combs, 173 F.3d at 350; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 350.
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conflicts with specific religious doctrines or practices. Such conflicts
are rarely found because courts usually conclude that church doctrine
does not support discrimination,137 but the courts have consistently
affirmed the availability of such special protection. Initially, the
courts’ analyses proceeded under the pre-Smith balancing
approach.138 This same framework—indeed, the same balancing
test—has been applied even after Smith.139
Stepping back from the details of these cases, what one observes
among the lower courts is limited protection for religious groups
where government regulation burdens religious belief or practice.
Where government regulation interferes with the organization’s
choice of clergy, it, by definition, burdens religion. In the words of
the D.C. Circuit, the “determination of ‘whose voice speaks for the
church’ is per se a religious matter.”140 In cases involving
nonministerial employees, a conflict between religious doctrine and
secular employment standards must be established. In either case,
however, courts have only granted relief in cases where religious
matters are impinged. The courts have not recognized a broad right
of church autonomy governing all aspects of church operations.
They repeatedly distinguish regulations interfering with religious
matters from those that touch only secular operations.141 It is not

137. See EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986); EEOC
v. Pacific Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Southwestern
Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 286 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Bollard v. Cal.
Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the Catholic
Church’s Jesuit Order does not support sexual harassment prohibited by Title VII); Dole v.
Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1397 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that church
members do not believe that the Bible mandates a pay differential based on gender).
138. See, e.g., Shenandoah, 899 F.2d at 1397–98; Fremont, 781 F.2d at 1367–69; Pacific
Press, 676 F.2d at 1279–81; Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 286–87.
139. See, e.g., Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946, 948 (applying the Sherbert balancing test where
the facts did not support the application of the ministerial exception); see also Elvig v. Calvin
Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 959, 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that even when
the ministerial exception does not apply, a church may invoke First Amendment protections
for actions based in religious doctrine).
140. Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354,
1356 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting district court below, 699 F. Supp. 954, 955 (D.D.C. 1988));
see also Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 805 (quoting Minker); Bollard, 196 F.3d at 949 (same); Scharon
v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991) (same).
141. See e.g., Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947–48; Shenandoah, 899 F.2d at 1397–98; Minker,
894 F.2d at 1358; Fremont, 781 F.2d at 1368–69; Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of SeventhDay Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985); Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1279–80;
Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 284–85; Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (D.
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intrusion on church matters alone that is unconstitutional. The
impact of regulation on the organization may be substantial but still
permissible. The “relevant inquiry is not the impact of the statute
upon the institution, but the impact of the statute upon the
institution’s exercise of its sincerely held religious beliefs.”142 As the
Ninth Circuit has explained, “while we recognize that applying any
laws to religious institutions necessarily interferes with the unfettered
autonomy churches would otherwise enjoy, this sort of generalized
and diffuse concern for church autonomy, without more, does not
exempt them from the operation of secular laws.”143 Rather, the
employment decision at issue must involve either a “protected
choice,” such as the choice of clergy, or a “doctrinal” justification.144
One also observes that lower courts in the employment area have
uniformly rejected the rule in Smith as the standard for religious
group rights. The courts have limited Smith to cases involving
individual free exercise rights, and they have turned instead to the
Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute precedent for guidance.
By contrast, in cases addressing the application of labor statutes
to religious organizations, courts have been more willing to adopt
the approach in Smith. Lower-court case law in this area has been
shaped significantly by the Supreme Court’s decision in Catholic
Bishop. Recall that the Court in Catholic Bishop construed the
National Labor Relations Act to exclude lay teachers at religiously
affiliated schools.145 According to the Court, application of the Act in
this context would give rise to serious constitutional questions, and
in the absence of clear congressional intent to cover the teachers, the
Court declined to construe the Act to include them. Catholic Bishop
was decided in 1979, and in the decade following that decision,
lower federal courts narrowed the scope of the Supreme Court’s
decision as they applied the Act to religiously affiliated social services
organizations such as hospitals,146 nursing homes,147 homes for
Colo. 1994); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363,
1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
142. EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Fremont, 781
F.2d at 1369 (quoting Mississippi College); Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1280 (same).
143. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 948.
144. Id.; see also Elvig, 375 F.3d at 956, 964 (following Bollard).
145. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
146. See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1983); St. Elizabeth
Cmty. Hosp. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1983).
147. See Tressler Lutheran Home for Children v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1982).
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neglected and troubled children,148 and day care centers.149
According to these courts, no serious First Amendment problems
arise in these contexts. Entanglement problems under the
Establishment Clause are unlikely because the programs function just
like secular charitable enterprises, and unlike schools, they do not
involve the dissemination of religious doctrine.150 While these
programs may be religiously motivated, their activities are primarily
and essentially secular.151
Lower federal courts also found that requiring these social
services organizations to bargain collectively under the Act would
not give rise to free exercise problems. All of these decisions pre-date
Smith, and like courts in the employment discrimination context,
courts in the labor area analyzed the free exercise rights of religious
organizations under the balancing approach that the Court had
developed for individual free exercise claims. The courts concluded
that the primarily secular character of the social services
organizations ensures that mandatory collective bargaining under the
Act will only minimally impact religious practices.152 The courts also
observed that none of the churches operating these programs have
religious objections to bargaining with unions.153 Moreover, any
minimal burden will be outweighed by the government’s compelling

148. See Volunteers of America-Minnesota-Bar None Boys Ranch v. NLRB, 752 F.2d
345 (8th Cir. 1985); NLRB v. St. Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1981); see also
Denver Post of the Nat’l Soc’y of the Volunteers of Am. v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 769 (10th Cir.
1984) (addressing church-operated programs for troubled children as well as programs
providing shelter for women and children and a program for victims of crime).
149. See NLRB v. Salvation Army of Mass. Dorchester Day Care Ctr., 763 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1985).
150. See Volunteers of Am., L.A. v. NLRB, 777 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1985)
(addressing church-operated detoxification and resident recovery programs); Bar None Boys
Ranch, 752 F.2d at 348–49; Denver Post, 732 F.2d at 771–73; St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708
F.2d at 1140–42; Tressler, 677 F.2d at 305; St. Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d at 64–65.
151. See Volunteers of Am., L.A., 777 F.2d at 1390; Bar None Boys Ranch, 752 F.2d at
348; Salvation Army, 763 F.2d at 6; Denver Post, 732 F.2d at 772–73; St. Elizabeth Hosp., 715
F.2d 1193, 1196; St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1441; Tressler, 677 F.2d at 305; St.
Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d at 64.
152. See St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1442–43; see also Bar None Boys Ranch,
752 F.2d at 349 (finding that impairment of sectarian objectives or practices is unlikely);
Tressler, 677 F.2d at 306–07 (“Although recognition of the union will impose some
constraints upon Tressler’s operation of the [nursing] Home, direct religious conflict is neither
inevitable nor probable.”).
153. See St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1442–43; Tressler, 677 F.2d at 306.
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interest in protecting worker rights and securing labor peace.154 As in
the employment area, the courts repeated that “the relevant inquiry
is not the impact of the statute upon the institution, but the impact
of the statute upon the institution’s exercise of its sincerely held
religious beliefs.”155
More recently, state and lower federal courts have gone even
further and upheld the application of state labor laws to lay teachers
at church-operated schools.156 According to these courts, unlike the
NLRA, the state labor provisions clearly cover teachers at religiously
affiliated schools, and, thus, the constitutional issues avoided in
Catholic Bishop must be addressed.157 These courts have uniformly
found that mandatory collective bargaining under state law would
result neither in excessive entanglement prohibited by the
Establishment Clause nor in a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause.158 In Catholic High School Ass’n of the Archdiocese of New
York v. Culvert,159 the only case addressing collective bargaining
under state law decided prior to Smith, the Second Circuit analyzed
the free exercise claim under the Sherbert balancing approach.160
According to the Second Circuit, collective bargaining under New
York’s statute does not conflict with religious doctrine.161 Indeed,

154. See St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1442–43; Tressler, 677 F.2d at 306–07.
155. St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1442 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting and citing EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Pacific
Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr.,
940 F.2d 1295, 1305–06 (9th Cir. 1991) (same) (upholding application of NLRA to
nonfaculty employees at church-operated residential school for boys).
156. See Catholic High Sch. Ass’n of the Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161
(2d Cir. 1985); South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709 (N.J. 1997); N.Y. State Employment Relations Bd. v.
Christ the King Reg’l High Sch., 682 N.E.2d 960 (N.Y. 1997); Hill-Murray Fed’n of
Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992).
157. See Culvert, 753 F.2d at 1163, 1164 (noting that the New York State Labor
Relations Act was amended in 1968 to bring employees of charitable, educational, and
religious organizations within its scope); St. Teresa, 696 A.2d at 713, 714 (observing that the
New Jersey constitution guarantees persons in private employment the right to organize and
bargain collectively); Hill-Murray, 487 N.W.2d at 862 (stating that while the legislature did
not consider application of the Minnesota Labor Relations Act to religious organizations,
Minnesota’s rules of statutory construction clearly support their coverage).
158. See Culvert, 753 F.2d at 1166–71; St. Teresa, 696 A.2d at 585–602; Christ the
King, 682 N.E.2d at 963–66; Hill-Murray, 487 N.W.2d at 862–64.
159. 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1985).
160. See Culvert, 753 F.2d at 1169.
161. See id. at 1170.
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the court observed that the Catholic Church has long supported
unions and worker rights.162 The court also found that the state’s
compelling interest in protecting the rights of employees and
preserving labor peace outweighs any minimal burden on free
exercise rights.163
After Smith, courts addressing the application of state labor
provisions to religiously affiliated schools have uniformly adopted the
rule in Smith. According to these courts, labor laws are neutral laws
of general applicability, and, thus, religious organizations are not
entitled to any special exemptions unless their claims fall within one
of the few categories of cases in which Smith preserved the balancing
approach.164 At first glance, the decision of lower courts to follow
Smith in the labor area but not in cases involving employment
discrimination may seem puzzling. However, this difference can,
perhaps, be explained by the fact that the free exercise analysis in
labor cases had always been narrower. Unlike cases involving
employment discrimination laws, lower courts evaluating labor
statutes never drew upon the Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute
cases for guidance.165 They relied entirely on the Court’s pre-Smith
balancing approach. Even the Supreme Court in Catholic Bishop
made no reference to the Court’s intrachurch dispute decisions when
it found that the application of the NLRA to church-operated
schools would give rise to serious First Amendment questions. Thus,
when Smith was decided, it is not surprising that the abandonment
of the Court’s balancing test meant the adoption of the Smith rule.
In the labor area, in contrast to the employment context, the lower
courts did not have alternative precedent on hand to support
continuing protections.
In none of these labor cases, however, does one find a wholehearted commitment to the implications of Smith. For example, in
New York State Labor Relations Board v. Christ the King Regional

162. Id.
163. See id. at 1170–71.
164. See South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 721–22 (N.J. 1997); N.Y. State Employment
Relations Bd. v. Christ the King Reg’l High Sch., 682 N.E.2d 960, 963–64 (N.Y. 1997); HillMurray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 862–63 (Minn. 1992).
165. The Seventh Circuit in Catholic Bishop had cited this line of precedent once, see
Catholic Bishop of Chi. v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1977), but the Supreme
Court did not draw upon this precedent, nor have subsequent lower court decisions.

1659

1BRD-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/16/2004 12:33 PM

[2004

High School,166 the New York Court of Appeals purported to follow
Smith when it rejected a Catholic high school’s objection to
coverage under New York’s labor statute,167 but the court left open
the possibility that relief might be granted in situations where the
collective bargaining process actually impinges upon religious belief
or practice.168 Likewise, in Hill-Murray Federation of Teachers v.
Hill-Murray High School,169 the Minnesota Supreme Court followed
Smith when evaluating a Catholic high school’s First Amendment
challenge to coverage under Minnesota’s labor statute,170 but the
court then applied a balancing approach under the state’s
constitution.171 Noting the Catholic Church’s traditional support for
unions,172 the court found no violation of state free exercise rights as
long as mandatory subjects of bargaining are restricted to wages,
hours, and other secular terms of employment.173 In South Jersey
Catholic School Teachers Organization v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus
Church Elementary School,174 as well, the New Jersey Supreme Court
followed Smith but also applied a balancing approach. The schools in
that case had attempted to establish a “hybrid claim” involving the
Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with the freedom of association
and the right of parents to control the upbringing of their
children.175 Where such hybrid claims can be established, Smith
preserves the balancing approach developed in Sherbert, but the New
Jersey Court found no support for the schools’ associational or
parental rights claims.176 Even so, the New Jersey court applied the
Sherbert balancing test and found no free exercise violation.177
According to the court, as long as mandatory bargaining is limited to

166. 682 N.E.2d 960 (N.Y. 1997).
167. See id. at 963–64.
168. See id. at 964, 966.
169. 487 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992).
170. See id. at 862–63.
171. See id. at 864–65.
172. See id. at 865.
173. See id. at 866 (“While Hill-Murray may have demonstrated that the application of
the MLRA [Minnesota Labor Relations Act] interferes with their authority as an employer,
they have not established that this minimal interference excessively burdens their religious
beliefs.”).
174. 696 A.2d 709 (N.J. 1997).
175. See id. at 721–22.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 722–23.
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secular terms and conditions of employment, the state’s compelling
interest in preserving labor peace and worker rights outweighs the
burden on free exercise.178
While courts in the labor area have, perhaps, been reluctant to
commit fully to the implications of Smith, lower courts in other
contexts have more readily embraced Smith. While this Article
focuses on legislative regulation in the labor and employment
contexts, examples of such readiness may be found in cases applying
secular tort standards to religious entities. Increasingly, courts are
adopting the Smith rule in cases involving tort claims against
churches whose clergy have engaged in sexual abuse of children or
sexual misconduct involving adults. These courts have held that
claims for negligent hiring and supervision of clergy and breach of
fiduciary duty do not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the
applicable tort principles are neutral rules of general applicability.179
The Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute cases are distinguished on
the ground that they prohibit entanglement with religious doctrine,
not application of neutral government rules.180 According to a recent
decision by the Florida Supreme Court, “[t]o hold otherwise and
immunize the Church Defendants from suit could risk placing
religious institutions in a preferred position over secular institutions,
a concept both foreign and hostile to the First Amendment.”181
So far my discussion of labor and employment cases has included
illustrations of two of the three approaches to government regulation
of religious groups that can be found in Supreme Court precedent.
Courts addressing employment discrimination statutes have provided
relief where the government burdens religious belief and practice. In
the labor context, courts after Smith have taken a different approach
and have held that religious organizations are not entitled to special
exemptions from neutral regulation even if the government interferes
178. See id. at 712, 716–17, 722–23.
179. See, e.g., Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 139,
144–45 (D. Conn. 2003); Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66, 73–74
(D. Conn. 1995); Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 376 (Fla. 2002); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d
347, 354, 361, 364 (Fla. 2002). But see Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692
A.2d 441, 445 (Me. 1997) (“To import agency principles wholesale into church governance
and to impose liability for any deviation from the secular standard is to impair the free exercise
of religion and to control denominational governance. Pastoral supervision is an ecclesiastical
prerogative.”).
180. See Doe, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 144; Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 363–64.
181. Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 365.
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with religious matters. No case has yet to adopt the third approach
and establish a broad right to autonomy over all internal operations.
There are, however, several decisions approving the ministerial
exception that have used language consistent with such a right.
Indeed, when the Fifth Circuit first carved out the ministerial
exception in McClure v. Salvation Army,182 the court used broad
language to describe the rights of religious organizations. The court
began by recalling that the First Amendment “has built a ‘wall of
separation’ between church and State.”183 The court then turned to
the Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute cases, which, in the court’s
words, “place matters of church government and administration
beyond the purview of civil authorities.”184 The court repeated the
statement from Kedroff that this line of cases “radiates . . . a spirit of
freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular
control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for themselves,
free from state interference, matters of church government as well as
those of faith and doctrine.”185 The Fifth Circuit expressly limited its
decision to the church-minister relationship,186 and it never stated
that all matters of church administration, no matter how secular or
mundane, are protected by the First Amendment. However, the
court left open that possibility, and its broad language easily lends
support.
Subsequent Fifth Circuit cases decided shortly after McClure
interpreted McClure and the ministerial exception narrowly.187
According to these cases, only where there is an actual burden on
religious beliefs and practice is protection warranted.188 However,
broad language reappears in later cases, most prominently in the
D.C. Circuit’s opinion in EEOC v. Catholic University of America189

182. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 559.
185. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344
U.S. 94, 116 (1952), quoted in McClure, 460 F.2d at 560.
186. See McClure, 460 F.2d at 555.
187. See EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Southwestern
Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981); see also supra text accompanying
notes 125–26.
188. See Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d at 488 (“[T]he relevant inquiry is not the impact of the
statute upon the institution, but the impact of the statute upon the institution’s exercise of its
sincerely held religious beliefs.”).
189. 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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and the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Combs v. Central Texas
Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church.190 Within the
Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute cases, the D.C. Circuit found a
“constitutional right of a church to manage its own affairs free from
government interference”191 and “affirmation of a church’s
sovereignty over its own affairs.”192 The court “agree[d] with the
Fifth Circuit [in McClure] that ‘throughout these opinions there
exists a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an
independence from secular control or manipulation.’”193 Churches
have the “freedom to decide how [they] will govern [themselves]”194
and a “constitutional right of autonomy in [their] own domain.”195
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit in Combs wrote of the “fundamental right
of churches to be free from government interference in their internal
management and administration.”196 Secular authorities may not
“insert[]” themselves into “the internal management of a church,”
which is “a realm where the Constitution forbids [them] to tread.”197
Like the McClure court, the court in Combs recalled the
“constitutional mandate to preserve the separation of church and
state.”198
Neither the D.C. Circuit in Catholic University nor the Fifth
Circuit in Combs stated that the protected realm of church affairs
extends to all matters, secular and religious alike, and their holdings
were limited to affirming the right of churches to make employment
decisions regarding ministers free from government interference.
However, neither court restricted the protected area to the choice of
clergy, and the language and spirit of these opinions seems to go
much further. These cases leave open the possibility of a broad right
of church autonomy and, indeed, provide the supporting framework.

190. 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999).
191. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 460.
192. Id. at 463.
193. Id. at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McClure v. Salvation Army,
460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian
Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952))).
194. Id. at 463.
195. Id. at 467.
196. Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173
F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999).
197. Id. at 350.
198. Id. at 351.
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C. Scholarly Views
The same split that appears among lower court opinions is also
found in scholarly literature addressing the rights of religious
organizations. The most prominent defense of a broad right of
church autonomy has been made by Douglas Laycock.199 According
to Laycock, the Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute cases, its
decision in Catholic Bishop, and its commitment to nonentanglement
all support a strong “right of church autonomy” under the Free
Exercise Clause.200 Laycock argues that “churches have a
constitutionally protected interest in managing their own institutions
free of government interference,”201 and this right “extends to every
aspect of church operations,” including “to routine administrative
matters.”202 According to Laycock, government regulation need not
burden religious beliefs or practices to violate the First
Amendment;203 any interference with “church control of church
institutions”204 is prohibited. The right of church autonomy is
essentially a right “to be left alone.”205
Of course, Laycock recognizes that a right to church autonomy
cannot be absolute.206 There must be some limits to protect
nonmembers and even members in truly compelling circumstances.
While I will be defending a broad right of church autonomy in this
Article, I will not be tackling the difficult issue of where these
limitations lie. However, some general observations are helpful. First,
any limitations on the right of church autonomy must be drawn
narrowly and must identify with specificity the permissible areas of
government regulation. As is seen from the labor cases discussed
above, courts applying the pre-Smith balancing approach readily
found compelling state interests to justify government regulation.
Lower federal courts upholding the application of labor statutes to
199. See Laycock, supra note 16; see also Douglas Laycock, The Right to Church
Autonomy as Part of Free Exercise of Religion, in GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS
AFFAIRS, II, at 28 (Dean M. Kelley ed., 1986).
200. Laycock, supra note 16, at 1394–98; Laycock, The Right to Church Autonomy, supra
note 199, at 32–34.
201. Laycock, supra note 16, at 1373.
202. Id. at 1398.
203. See id. at 1373, 1398.
204. Id. at 1394.
205. Id. at 1376.
206. See id. at 1394.
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religious employers identified the government’s interest in preserving
labor peace and protecting worker rights.207 Given the small number
of religious employers in the overall economy and the fact that the
National Labor Relations Board had for decades declined jurisdiction
over nonprofit institutions, religious and nonreligious alike,208 the
existence of such a compelling state interest in the context of
religious employers was doubtful.
Thus, instead of a general compelling state interest test that
leaves outcomes uncertain, limitations on the right of church
autonomy should take the form of narrowly tailored restraints in
specific areas where government regulation is appropriate. When
identifying these areas and restrictions, the strong presumption must
be in favor of freedom for religious groups. For example, one area of
appropriate regulation would be protections for outsiders. Religious
organizations can be held liable upon their valid contracts, and tort
liability is also appropriate where there are injuries to outsiders.209
Contracts between religious groups and their members or employees
should also be enforceable if the language and circumstances of the
agreement would clearly lead the promisee to believe that the
contract was civilly enforceable.210 However, the contract terms must
be clear and capable of interpretation without involving the courts in
religious questions. In addition, courts should avoid adjudicating
contract claims involving ministers unless the agreement expressly
provides for such secular enforcement.
Regulations designed to protect the health and safety of
members and employees would also be appropriate where death or
serious bodily harm is threatened.211 Slightly broader protections
207. See supra notes 154, 163, 178, and accompanying text.
208. The Board began asserting jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations in the early
1970s and shortly thereafter adopted the same jurisdictional standards for nonprofit and forprofit organizations. See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Mandatory Collective
Bargaining Under Federal and State Labor Laws: Freedom From and Freedom For, 49 VILL. L.
REV. 77, 152 & n.450, 162–63 (2004).
209. Laycock agrees. See Laycock, supra note 16, at 1406.
210. Laycock would require clear evidence that the church desires secular adjudication.
See Laycock, supra note 16, at 1404 & n.238; Douglas Laycock & Susan E. Waelbroeck,
Academic Freedom and the Free Exercise of Religion, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1468 (1988). My
suggestion is slightly different. Even if organizational consent to secular adjudication cannot be
established, contracts with members or employees would be civilly enforceable if the language
and circumstances of the agreement would clearly lead the promisee to believe that such
adjudication was contemplated.
211. Again, Laycock agrees. See Laycock, supra note 16, at 1406, 1417.
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may be permissible for children and for adults whose impaired
mental or physical condition makes them especially vulnerable to
exploitation. Thus, tort liability for inadequate supervision of church
employees would be appropriate where clergy engage in sexual abuse
of minors or sexual misconduct with vulnerable adults. However, in
keeping with the strong presumption in favor of organizational
freedom, such liability for inadequate supervision should probably be
limited to cases in which church officials acted recklessly rather than
merely negligently,212 and liability with respect to the hiring or
retention of clergy should be prohibited altogether. Protection of
child welfare may also justify regulation in the context of churchoperated schools, but such regulations must also be narrow and
limited. States might, for instance, require church-operated schools
to demonstrate that students achieve at minimum levels of
proficiency on standardized tests, but direct regulation of
educational programs should be prohibited. In addition, where
religious organizations hold themselves out as providers of
professional services such as legal advice or medical care, they can be
required to meet generally applicable professional standards.
These examples are not designed to be definitive or exhaustive.
My purpose, rather, has been to illustrate several important points.
First, the right of church autonomy is strong, but it is not absolute.
In some circumstances, regulations protecting church members and
nonmembers are appropriate, but these circumstances are narrow
and limited. Second, there is no simple test to identify when
regulations are permissible and when they are not. Depending on the
area of government regulation, the appropriate restrictions on the
right of church autonomy may be different. Vigorous protection of
religious organizations requires careful delineation of the rules
appropriate in each context.
Whether the receipt of government aid justifies greater
regulation is a separate but very important question. Certainly,

212. If claims for negligent supervision are permitted, the result will be the imposition of
secular standards of care on organizations that may have their own highly developed
procedures and practices for clergy oversight and discipline. Where such secular standards
displace practices that reflect the group’s religious values or traditional understandings of
organizational structure and responsibility, the interference will be great. Such interference is
appropriate where the organization’s leaders have acted recklessly, but organizational freedom
should, arguably, prevail where the group’s leaders have been well-intentioned and have not
acted recklessly.
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lawmakers and funding agencies can require religious organizations
to account for their expenditures of public funds in order to ensure
that these funds are spent for the intended purposes and programs.
Scholars debate whether the government may go further and apply
regulations designed to shape the internal practices of funded
organizations in the direction of public values.213 This question has
become more pressing in recent years. While the social services
programs of many religious denominations have long received
significant amounts of government aid, until recently, Supreme
Court precedent placed substantial limitations on aid to programs
suffused with religious purpose and function. In the last few years,
however, the Supreme Court has revised its Establishment Clause
doctrine to permit greater aid to these types of religious
organizations,214 and the current Bush administration has been
pushing hard for increased funding for faith-based organizations,
including organizations with significant religious identity and
activity.215
The extent to which government funding may justify greater
regulation of religious groups is beyond the scope of this Article, but
the basic principles I develop here provide the necessary foundation
for addressing this issue. If, as I argue, a broad right of church
autonomy benefits not only religious groups but also the larger
community by protecting alternative visions for social and political
life, regulations designed to shape internal practices according to
prevailing public values would be shortsighted and illegitimate.
Permissible regulations would instead focus largely on ensuring

213. For articles engaging this debate, see Symposium, Public Values in an Era of
Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (2003); see also Steven K. Green, Religious
Discrimination, Public Funding, and Constitutional Values, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1
(2002); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and
the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 972–82 (2003).
214. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding voucher aid to
religious schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (holding that church-operated
schools may receive secular educational equipment and materials under a neutral direct aid
program).
215. See Mike Allen, Bush Presses “Faith-Based” Agenda; President Proposes Regulations To
Ease Federal Funding, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2003, at A10; Alan Cooperman, Grants to
Religious Groups Top $1.1 Billion; Administration Lauds Initiative, WASH. POST, Mar. 10,
2004, at A27; see also IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, THE STATE OF THE LAW 2003:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW CONCERNING GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS WITH RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS i–ii (2003).
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accountability when public funds are expended and protecting
recipients from coercion, abuse, and exploitation.
While Laycock and a few other scholars have supported a broad
right of church autonomy,216 a greater number of scholars have
favored the path taken by lower courts in the employment
discrimination area. Like courts that have carved out the ministerial
exception, some of these scholars have identified certain aspects of
church administration that should receive special protection under
the First Amendment. For example, Bruce Bagni has argued that the
“purely spiritual” matters at the “core or heart” of the church should
be protected from government regulation except where the state’s
interest is truly compelling.217 According to Bagni, these matters are
the “spiritual epicenter” of the church, and within this epicenter,
Bagni includes the relationship between church and minister,
membership policies, religious education, worship, and ritual.218
Where activities lie outside this epicenter, they can be regulated in
proportion to their degree of secularity.219
Carl Esbeck supports a similar distinction under the
Establishment Clause. Esbeck envisions the Establishment Clause as
a “structural restraint on governmental power”220 that bars the
government from intruding on “inherently religious”221 matters.
These matters include those “exclusively religious activities” at the
core of the organization’s religious identity, 222 such as worship,
teaching, propagation of the faith, doctrine, ecclesiastical polity,
.

216. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 27–
28; Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 146,
158–61 (1986); cf. Steven D. Smith, Separation and the “Secular”: Reconstructing the
Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 1018 (1989) (arguing that the institutional
separation required by the Establishment Clause prohibits government from interfering in the
internal affairs of religious organizations).
217. Bagni, supra note 106, at 1539.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 1540.
220. Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental
Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2 (1998).
221. Id. at 109; Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid
Separationism and the Establishment Clause, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 285,
309 (1999).
222. Esbeck, supra note 220, at 109; see also Esbeck, supra note 106, at 381 (arguing
that government may not interfere with “matters central to [the] religious identity and
mission” of religious societies); id. at 402 (arguing that “core religious activities” should
receive special protection).
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church discipline, membership rules, and personnel decisions
regarding clergy and other employees chosen on the basis of
religion.223 According to Esbeck, within this “domain,” churches
have a “sphere of autonomy” that is outside the competence and
jurisdiction of the state.224 With respect to matters that are not
inherently religious, such as some aspects of social services work, the
Establishment Clause permits regulation,225 though even here “[a]
special wariness should characterize the relationship.”226
Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle also draw upon the Establishment
Clause and envision a “zone”227 of religious activity that is beyond
the competence and jurisdiction of government.228 This area of
“ecclesiastical immunity”229 consists of the “aspects of the behavior
of religious institutions that are bound up with the sacred,”230 and
includes matters such as the employment of clergy,231 worship,232 and
organizational polity.233 According to Lupu and Tuttle, when
“religious institutions act in uniquely religious ways, making
connections with the world beyond the temporal and material
concerns . . . of the state,” they are protected from government
interference.234 On the other hand, where the functions of religious
institutions resemble other nonprofit organizations, Lupu and Tuttle
favor a rule of neutrality that treats religious and nonreligious
institutions alike.235
Each of these scholars draws a line between specially protected
religious activities and activities that do not receive special treatment.
223. See Esbeck, supra note 220, at 10–11, 44–45, 109; Esbeck, supra note 106, at 376,
397, 420; Esbeck, supra note 221, at 308.
224. Esbeck, supra note 220, at 77.
225. See Esbeck, supra note 221, at 304–05; Esbeck, supra note 220, at 79; Esbeck,
supra note 106, at 377–78.
226. Esbeck, supra note 106, at 378.
227. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 83.
228. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 83–84, 91–92; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W.
Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789, 1807 (citing
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 92).
229. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 228, at 1807.
230. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 84; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 228, at
1806.
231. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 91; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 228, at 1810.
232. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 228, at 1806–07.
233. See id. at 1808.
234. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 92.
235. See id. at 78–79, 92.
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Those matters that are quintessentially or inherently religious are
accorded strong protection from government intervention, but other
practices can be regulated. Thus, religious organizations receive
some relief from state regulation, but the areas of relief are limited.
Other scholars favor the balancing approach developed by the
Supreme Court prior to Smith. For example, in an article written in
1986, William Marshall and Douglas Blomgren favored free exercise
protections where government regulation interferes with religious
practices or conflicts with matters of church doctrine.236 Regulation
of core religious activities like the employment of clergy would
infringe upon free exercise,237 but so would other types of
government interference with religious doctrine and practice.
Marshall and Blomgren do not draw distinctions between
quintessentially religious activities and those that are less religiously
significant.
The final approach to government regulation of religious
institutions also has supporters in the academy. According to these
scholars, religious organizations are not entitled to special
protections from neutral government regulation even when religious
practice is burdened. For example, Marci Hamilton argues that the
rule in Smith should be extended to cases involving religious
groups.238 In his earlier work, Ira Lupu also rejected special
exemptions for religious organizations.239 Lupu’s defense of this
approach predated Smith, and he drew upon the Supreme Court’s
intrachurch dispute cases for support. In Jones v. Wolf, Lupu argued,
the Court “made clear that the constitutional evil to be avoided” is
not interference with organizational free exercise but entanglement
with religious doctrine.240 While the Wolf Court did argue that the
neutral-principles method it approved is consistent with free exercise
values, religious organizations are afforded no special freedoms
under this approach.241 The ability of religious organizations to

236. See Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 106, at 327. In more recent years, Marshall
has been a leading opponent of free exercise exemptions, and he has defended the Court’s
Smith decision. See Marshall, The Case Against, supra note 7; Marshall, In Defense of Smith,
supra note 7.
237. See Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 106, at 327–28.
238. See Hamilton, supra note 64, at 1176–77.
239. See Lupu, supra note 64, at 395, 399, 431.
240. Id. at 407.
241. See id. at 407–08.
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structure legal documents and transactions to ensure desired
outcomes in the event of disputes is no different than the freedoms
enjoyed by other corporate bodies.242
Lupu also observes that special protections for religious
organizations would result in advantages that favor religious
associations over secular ones.243 Many other scholars have found this
type of favoritism troubling,244 and some scholars have also, like the
Florida Supreme Court, discussed above, found such a “preferred
position” problematic under the Establishment Clause.245 In
addition, many scholars observe that the trend of the Supreme
Court’s decisions is towards a neutralism that treats religious and
nonreligious entities equally for Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause purposes.246 Smith embraced this neutralism in the free
exercise field, and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris.247 permitting religiously affiliated schools to
participate in voucher programs embraced neutralism in the
Establishment Clause field.248
Lupu makes an additional observation. The behavior of religious
organizations, including a group’s internal practices, affects society at
large. Religious institutions, “like other important social institutions,
are influential in shaping behavior and moral convictions.”249 Thus,
what goes on inside the institution has consequences for those
outside of the organization, and exemptions from neutral, generally
242. See id.
243. See id. at 401–03.
244. See, e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 7, at 1248; Gedicks, An Unfirm
Foundation, supra note 7, at 556, 574; Gedicks, Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, supra note
7, at 927; Marshall, In Defense of Smith, supra note 7, at 319–23.
245. Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 365 (Fla. 2002). For a discussion of Malicki, see
supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text. For an example of scholarship that argues that
special exemptions for religious organizations and individuals violate the Establishment Clause,
see Marshall, In Defense of Smith, supra note 7, at 320; Marshall, The Case Against, supra note
7, at 388–94.
246. Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Improbability of Religion Clause Theory, 27 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1233, 1235–36 (1997); Greenawalt, supra note 67, at 1870; Scott C. Idleman,
Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219,
252–53 (2000); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 68–71; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 213, at
918–919.
247. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
248. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 213, at 918–19; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at
70. But see Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1313 (2004) (reaffirming the distinctive
treatment of religion under the First Amendment).
249. Lupu, supra note 64, at 408.
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applicable government policies, such as antidiscrimination policies,
may harm those outside the group.250 Church members are not the
only ones who have an interest in internal church affairs,251 and
special protections often come at the expense of the larger
community.252
III. LESSONS FROM SMITH
As the previous section demonstrates, Supreme Court precedent,
lower-court case law, and scholarly writing leave us with three very
different approaches to neutral government regulation that interferes
with the internal affairs of religious organizations. In this section, I
will identify the approach that I believe to be the most appropriate.
As I noted in the introduction, I will be using the Smith decision as a
prism through which to analyze the rights of religious organizations
under the Free Exercise Clause. For some courts and scholars, Smith
has nothing to say about free exercise protections for religious
groups. Smith addresses only the rights of individual believers, and
other precedents, such as the Court’s intrachurch dispute cases,
provide the standard for religious groups. For other courts and
scholars, Smith means the same thing for religious groups as it does
for individuals. Neither receive special protection when neutral
regulation interferes with religious practice. In my view, neither
interpretation is correct. The rule in Smith for individual believers is
not the same standard that should apply to government regulation of
religious groups. However, the analysis in Smith is not irrelevant to
assessing the scope of religious group rights. To the contrary, Smith
raises a number of issues that help to clarify what is at stake in
choosing among the different options. When these issues are
examined closely, the results are surprising. Smith supports a broad
right of autonomy for religious groups that extends to internal
matters with clear religious significance as well as activities that
appear more mundane or secular.

250. See id. at 408–09.
251. See id. at 409.
252. See id. at 403.
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A. Religious Groups and Freedom of Belief

The first guidepost that Smith provides lies in the first few lines
of the Court’s analysis where the Court draws a distinction between
protections for religious beliefs and protections for religious action.
According to Smith, the “free exercise of religion means, first and
foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine
one desires.”253 Watson v. Jones expressed a similar view. In America,
the “law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no
dogma, the establishment of no sect.”254 Action receives less
protection. While an individual is free to believe whatever he or she
chooses, the Free Exercise Clause does not guarantee the right to act
on these beliefs where neutral laws of general applicability stand in
the way.255 An individual’s religious beliefs do not “excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the
State is free to regulate.”256
According to the Court, greater protection for action under the
balancing approach developed in Sherbert is problematic for several
reasons. First, if a religious believer is entitled to an exemption
whenever the government burdens religious conduct and the state’s
interest is not compelling, the believer will “become a law unto
himself,”257 and chaos will ensue.258 Such a rule is especially
dangerous in a nation that includes and values diverse religious
beliefs.259 Furthermore, the Sherbert balancing test unfairly privileges
religious liberty over other constitutional rights.260 In other contexts
such as the Equal Protection and Speech Clauses, compelling state
interest analysis produces “equality of treatment and an unrestricted
flow of contending speech”; here it would “produce a private right
to ignore generally applicable laws[, which] is a constitutional
anomaly.”261 In addition, limiting free exercise protection to burdens
on religious practices that are central to the believer’s faith is
253. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
254. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872).
255. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79.
256. Id. at 879.
257. Id. at 885 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)).
258. See id. at 888.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 886.
261. Id.
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unworkable.262 Judges are not fit to investigate and determine which
beliefs are central in different religious traditions.263
While the Free Exercise Clause does not require individual
exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability, Smith does
envision legislative relief.264 The Free Exercise Clause reflects a
solicitude for religious liberty that can be expected from the
democratic processes as well.265 The Smith Court points to and
approves
of
the
frequency
of
reasonable
legislative
accommodations.266 While the Court admits that minority religious
practices will be at a “relative disadvantage” in this process, this is
unavoidable and preferable to the anarchy that is threatened under
the Sherbert approach.267
Thus, in the world that Smith envisions, the beliefs and actions of
religious individuals are treated very differently. In the realm of ideas,
Smith envisions unrestricted freedom. The Free Exercise Clause
entitles individuals to believe and profess whatever doctrines they
desire, and Smith expects that individuals will hold a wide range of
different religious views, orthodox as well as unorthodox, popular
and unpopular. Restrictions on religious practice are, by contrast,
unavoidable, but Smith hopes that legislatures will make
accommodations where reasonable. Moreover, Smith does not
expect restrictions on action to affect the complexity and diversity of
opinion. Religious individuals will continue to hold whatever
religious beliefs they desire even if the beliefs are not actionable. In
many cases, religious adherents will be successful in petitioning the
legislature for relief from burdensome laws. Adherents of minority
religions will be at a disadvantage in the legislative process, but they
will not be absent. Their actions may be circumscribed, but their
beliefs will be free.
The Smith Court says little about the conditions that would be
necessary to maintain the type of unrestricted freedom of belief that
it envisions. The Court does state that the government may not
regulate religious beliefs as such,268 and it also assumes that
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
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See id.
See id.
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government regulation that impairs individual practice will not
undermine the individual’s choice of belief. However, the Court
does not elaborate further. Nor does Smith address the proper
treatment of religious groups under the Free Exercise Clause.
Further examination of both these issues reveals an important link
between them. Religious groups play an indispensable role in
shaping and fostering the freedom of belief that Smith envisions and
is committed to.
Numerous scholars have observed the connection between
religious groups and individual religious convictions. Individuals
express and exercise their beliefs in religious communities,269 and
religious organizations also play an essential role in shaping the
beliefs that individuals hold.270 As Frederick Gedicks has written,
“[g]roups are ongoing and independent entities that influence in
their own right how individuals think, express themselves, and
act.”271 Thus, “[a]lthough in some respects groups are aggregations
of their individual members, in other respects, groups are prior to
and independent of their members.”272 Justice Brennan draws the
same connection between individual religious belief and group
activity in his concurrence in Amos.273 According to Justice Brennan,
“[f]or many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large
measure from participation in a larger religious community.”274
These religious groups do not simply express individual religious
beliefs, but the “community represents an ongoing tradition of
shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation
of individuals.”275

269. According to Carl Esbeck, “religious belief nearly always is expressed in some sort of
communal way.” Esbeck, supra note 106, at 374. Similarly, Douglas Laycock observes that
“[r]eligion includes important communal elements for most believers. They exercise their
religion through religious organizations.” Laycock, supra note 16, at 1389.
270. See John H. Garvey, Churches and the Free Exercise of Religion, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 567, 580–81 (1990); see also Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry
Adams’s Soul: Education and the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1842–43
(2001) (arguing that religious groups are among the intermediate institutions that shape and
form individuals).
271. Gedicks, supra note 106, at 107.
272. Id.
273. For discussion of Amos, see supra notes 94–103 and accompanying text.
274. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
275. Id.
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Groups play yet another important role in the formation of
individual belief. Religious communities are the vehicle for the
development of doctrine. It is through religious communities that
individuals jointly develop religious ideas and beliefs. Thus, the very
formulation of religious opinions takes place within religious groups,
as does the transmission and exercise of beliefs. Religious groups do
not simply shape their members, nor do fellow congregants simply
exercise preexisting convictions with like-minded believers. Rather,
religious communities are part of an ongoing conversation that both
shapes individuals and is shaped by them. In the sometimes rough
and tumble of congregational and denominational life, individuals
work together to define, refine, and reform religious ideas. Indeed,
this process is not limited to single congregations or even single
denominations. It takes place in a larger environment where religious
groups and their members constantly interact with and influence one
another. As communities face new circumstances and experiences,
they may look to other groups for guidance, or they may sharply
distinguish themselves, or they may do some of both. Individuals
and subgroups may split, new communions may be formed, and old
ones reformed. The lines that separate group from group are porous,
and individuals, subcommunities, and ideas cross back and forth.
Nor is the development of religious ideas and doctrine an
abstract affair. Religious organizations do not simply teach or
formulate doctrine in the abstract. They also seek to live out their
beliefs in their relationships with fellow communicants. They seek to
put their beliefs into action in shaping organizational structure,
developing rules for church discipline, clarifying the rights and duties
of members and employees, and fostering more informal social
expectations and standards. Indeed, it is through this process of
living beliefs in community that ideas are tested and, again, refined
and reformed. It is also through this process that beliefs are
preserved. Without the ability to put ideas into practice within the
community, it would be difficult for the group to maintain its
commitments and convictions. Indeed, without the opportunity to
practice their convictions in community life, church members may
not be able to fully understand what their beliefs mean and require.
Restrictions on individual action outside the community may not
undermine religious belief if these opportunities are present, but
restrictions on internal group life could be devastating.
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If religious groups play an essential role in shaping individual
religious belief and, indeed, in the very formulation of religious
ideas, the freedom of belief that Smith envisions requires protections
for religious organizations. If religious communities are not able to
teach, develop, and live out their ideas free from state interference,
individual belief will also be suppressed. The diversity of religious
beliefs that Smith envisions presupposes a diversity of religious
communities, each of which is able to structure its own internal life
according to its own unique religious views and perspectives.
Supreme Court precedent under the Speech Clause of the First
Amendment provides support for such protection. The Supreme
Court has long held that the individual’s freedom to engage in
speech activities under the First Amendment requires a
“corresponding right” to associate with others for those ends.276 The
right of association is “implicit” in First Amendment protections for
freedom of speech.277 Similarly, protections for religious groups are
implicit in the Free Exercise Clause’s commitment to freedom of
religious belief and profession. Full freedom of belief is not possible
without a corresponding right of religious groups to teach, develop,
and practice their doctrines and ideas.
Thus, of the three approaches to government regulation of
religious groups that can be found in existing Supreme Court
precedent, the rule in Smith for individual religious exercise is,
surprisingly, the least compatible with the decision’s underlying
principles. Special protections for religious organizations are
necessary at least where government regulation interferes with
religious belief or practice. Such protections would not give rise to
the same risk of chaos that the Smith Court feared in the context of
individual religious exercise.278 The exemption of individuals from
neutral laws of general applicability whenever a burden is proved and
a compelling state interest is absent may, indeed, be “courting
anarchy.”279 However, the same danger does not arise when religious
organizations are exempted from compliance with regulations that
interfere with internal community life. Permitting religious groups to
276. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000); Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Int’l v.
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622
(1984).
277. Dale, 530 U.S. at 647; Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622.
278. See supra notes 257–59, 267 (discussing Smith).
279. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
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shape community practice according to shared norms may have a
great impact upon the lives of members and employees, but any
direct effect on the larger society will usually be minimal. Where
outsiders would be harmed, limitations can be imposed as discussed
above. Federal courts holding that the ministerial exception survives
Smith agree. According to the D.C. Circuit, “the ministerial
exception does not present the dangers warned of in Smith.”280
Protections for the internal affairs of religious organizations do not
“empower a member of that church, ‘by virtue of his beliefs, to
become a law unto himself.’”281
Nor would special protections for religious organizations be
inconsistent with the equality that Smith prescribes for individuals.
For many scholars, Smith reflects the trend toward neutralism in the
Court’s recent case law. In both the free exercise and establishment
areas, the Supreme Court is increasingly treating religious individuals
and entities like nonreligious ones.282 However, it is important not to
read too much into the Smith decision. The Court in Smith did hold
that the Free Exercise Clause does not require special exemptions for
believers when neutral government regulations burden religious
practice. However, the Court did not hold that believers and
nonbelievers must always be treated alike. To the contrary, the Court
permits and, indeed, encourages legislatures to make special
accommodations when religious practice is burdened.283 Smith does
not reject all special or favorable treatment of religion. Indeed, it

280. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
281. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879))); see also Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting
and approving Catholic University, 83 F.3d 455). The Eleventh Circuit has made a similar
distinction:
The Court’s concern in Smith was that if an individual’s legal obligations were
contingent upon religious beliefs, those beliefs would allow each individual “‘to
become a law unto himself.’” The ministerial exception does not subvert this
concern; it was not developed to provide protection to individuals who wish to
observe a religious practice that contravenes a generally applicable law. Rather, the
exception only continues a long-standing tradition that churches are to be free from
government interference in matters of church governance and administration.
Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1303–04 (11th Cir.
2000) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S.
at 167)).
282. See supra notes 246–48 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 264–66 and accompanying text.
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expects and approves of such favoritism. Protections for religious
groups would be consistent, not inconsistent, with Smith.
B. Misunderstandings and Temptations
If special protections for religious groups are necessary to
preserve the freedom of belief that Smith envisions, the next step is
to determine how far these protections should extend. Does Smith
call for a broad right of church autonomy, or should protections be
limited to situations in which religious belief or practice is actually
burdened?
Certainly, religious groups should be entitled to relief where
government regulation conflicts with specific doctrines or practices.
The application of secular standards where such a conflict exists
would impede the organization’s ability to preserve and develop
doctrine. Indeed, in some cases, the effect of such application would
be to inject the government directly into religious disagreements and
decision making. For example, if Title VII’s prohibition against
gender discrimination in employment were applied to ministerial
decisions by religious groups, the government would be lending its
support to one side in a long-running struggle within American
congregations over the proper role of women in ministry. Those who
favor female clergy would be heavily favored over those with more
conservative views. Indeed, any time that government regulation
addresses difficult social or moral issues that also divide church
members, the imposition of the secular standard will disrupt the
process by which the religious group develops its own doctrine and
beliefs. Many Americans may approve of the results in cases where
religious groups hold unpopular or outdated views. However, the
First Amendment protects the freedom of individuals to hold these
views, and religious groups are entitled to the protections that make
such freedom possible.
Protections for religious organizations could also be extended to
areas of activity that scholars have identified as quintessentially or
inherently religious.284 Placing matters such as the church-minister
relationship, religious education, and worship outside the
competence of government makes sense insofar as these aspects of
church administration are closely related to the group’s religious

284. See supra notes 217–35 and accompanying text.
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mission. As federal courts carving out the ministerial exception have
argued, interference with such core religious matters by definition
burdens religion.285
Whether courts should go further and recognize a broad right of
church autonomy over all internal affairs is a more difficult issue. If
religious organizations receive relief whenever there are identifiable
burdens on religious exercise or whenever quintessentially religious
matters are involved, would further protection be gratuitous
favoritism that unfairly advantages religious groups over nonreligious
ones? On the other hand, is a broad right of church autonomy
necessary to fully protect the ability of religious groups to preserve
and transmit their unique beliefs and ways of life?
To answer these questions, one must look at another issue raised
in Smith. One of the reasons given by the Smith majority for its rule
regarding individual religious practice is the difficulty that judges
would have in identifying which beliefs are central in different
religious traditions. Providing relief whenever a believer’s religious
conduct is burdened by government action would produce chaos,
but limiting exemptions to situations involving practices central to
the individual’s faith is unworkable. Judges do not have the ability to
make such determinations: “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to
question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or
the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”286
If this concern is explored further in the group context, it becomes
clear that limiting judicial relief to actual burdens on group belief or
practice may be preferable in theory, but it is unworkable in fact.
Judges are no more fit to make the types of inquiries required under
such an approach than they are to identify which beliefs are central in
different religious traditions. The danger that judges will
misunderstand an organization’s beliefs and practices or be tempted
to distort these beliefs in order to reach desired outcomes is
considerable, whether the judge is trying to carve out specially
sensitive areas of church life or attempting to ascertain whether
government regulation conflicts with specific religious teachings. For
both types of inquires, it is possible to point to numerous cases in
which judges have inadvertently, and sometimes willfully,

285. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
286. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989)).
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misunderstood organizational belief. The result is significant
impingement on religious doctrine and practice. The only reliable
way to protect the religious beliefs and activities of religious groups
is a broad right of church autonomy that extends to all aspects of
church affairs, even the most routine and mundane.
The difficulty that courts have in ascertaining whether
government regulation burdens specific religious beliefs or practices
is illustrated well by cases in the labor and employment area. These
cases demonstrate that judicial efforts to identify burdens fail for
several reasons. For example, two federal circuit court opinions
addressing instances of gender discrimination in church-operated
schools illustrate the temptation that judges experience to misread
church doctrine in order to reach desired outcomes. In EEOC v.
Fremont Christian School,287 the EEOC sought to enforce Title VII
and the Equal Pay Act against a conservative Christian school that
offered health insurance to single employees and married men but
not to married women.288 Fremont Christian School (“Fremont”)
grounded its policy on biblical teaching that the husband is the head
of the household in a marriage and is required to provide for the
family.289 The Ninth Circuit rejected Fremont’s free exercise
argument because it found that application of Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act would not have a “significant impact”290 on the
school’s beliefs and only minimal impact on practice.291 The court
pointed to a statement made by the pastor of the church that
operated Fremont. According to the pastor, “the Church, believing
as it does, in the God-given dignity and the special role of women,
could not, without sin, treat women according to unfair
distinctions.”292 The court drew a connection between this statement
and the facts of an earlier case in which it had applied Title VII to a
religious organization that denied endorsing gender discrimination
in employment.293 The court also noted that the school had
abandoned its earlier practice of paying married men more than
287. 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986).
288. See EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1364–65 (9th Cir. 1986).
289. Id. at 1364.
290. Id. at 1368.
291. Id. at 1369.
292. Id. at 1368.
293. See id. (drawing on EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 (9th
Cir. 1981)).
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married women and that it now offered the same life and disability
insurance to both men and women.294
The court’s argument that application of the federal statutes
would not significantly burden Fremont’s religious beliefs and
practice is strained if not disingenuous. Application of these statutes
would prohibit a practice with clear religious grounding and would
prevent Fremont from recognizing the different roles of men and
women in its employment policies. The court twists the words of
Fremont’s pastor when it suggests that the church’s teaching does
not support pay and benefit differentials between men and women.
The pastor never stated, and indeed the church denied,295 that men
and women should be treated equally in all respects. “Unfair
distinctions” are prohibited, but not all distinctions. Fremont clearly
believed that different roles for men and women in marriage make
employment distinctions based on the husband’s role as head of the
household both fair and appropriate. While Fremont chose to give
women equal pay and insurance benefits, it had religious reasons for
differential treatment regarding health benefits. For Fremont, the
Bible provides clear support for a policy that is now prohibited by
government regulation. The court essentially second-guessed the
school’s understanding of its own beliefs and minimized the burden
of government regulation on the school.
The Fourth Circuit in Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church.296
made a similar mistake. Like Fremont, Shenandoah involved a
conservative Christian school that gave special benefits to married
men based on the biblical belief that the husband is the head of the
household.297 The school was operated by the Shenandoah Baptist
Church. Before salaries were increased across the board, Shenandoah
paid married male teachers a salary supplement that was not provided
to married women.298 The federal department of labor, joined later
by the EEOC, sought to enforce the Equal Pay Act,299 and the
Fourth Circuit held that application of the Act would not violate the

294. Id. at 1368.
295. Id. at 1364 (“Among the doctrinal beliefs held by the Church is the belief that,
while the sexes are equal in dignity before God, they are differentiated in role.”).
296. 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990).
297. Id. at 1391–92.
298. Id. at 1392.
299. Id. at 1392–93.
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Free Exercise Clause.300 As in Fremont, the court found that any
burden on Shenandoah’s beliefs would be minimal.301 According to
the court, “[t]he pay requirements at issue do not cut to the heart of
Shenandoah beliefs.”302 Shenandoah did not claim that the Bible
mandates a pay differential between men and women, and it had
voluntarily phased out the supplement on its own.303 The court’s
conclusion that application of the federal statute would not cut to
the heart of Shenandoah’s beliefs ignores the effect of its holding.
Shenandoah believes that men and women have different roles in the
marriage relationship and that these different roles authorize
differential treatment in employment settings. Application of the
federal statute would prohibit such differential treatment. While
Shenandoah no longer pays men and women differently, it believes
that such differential treatment is biblically based, and after the
court’s ruling, it no longer has the freedom to use pay differentials.
The court has, in effect, prohibited the church from living out beliefs
with clear religious grounding.
In Fremont and Shenandoah, the temptation to reach desirable
results almost certainly contributed to judicial second-guessing of
church doctrine and to minimization of the impact of government
regulation on church life. In other cases, failure of courts to identify
burdens on group practices and belief results from an unfamiliarity
with church doctrines. The complexity of church doctrine and its
development over time often makes ascertaining conflicts between
government regulation and church doctrine particularly difficult.
State and lower federal court cases upholding the application of labor
statutes to church institutions illustrate these problems.
Many of these cases have involved social services organizations or
schools operated by the Catholic Church, and courts have repeatedly
found that collective bargaining is consistent with Church
doctrine.304 Indeed, in several cases, the courts have observed that

300. Id. at 1397–99. The court also rejected Shenandoah’s Establishment Clause claim.
Id. at 1399.
301. Id. at 1397 (concluding that “any burden would be limited”).
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1397–98.
304. See, e.g., Catholic High Sch. Ass’n of the Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d
1161, 1170 (2d Cir. 1985); St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436, 1442–43
(9th Cir. 1983); Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857,
865 (Minn. 1992).
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the Catholic Church has long supported unionization and collective
bargaining. According to the Second Circuit in Catholic High School
Ass’n of the Archdiocese of New York v. Culvert, “the Encyclicals and
other Papal Messages make clear that the Catholic Church has for
nearly a century been among the staunchest supporters of the rights
of employees to organize and engage in collective bargaining.”305
The court continued with the additional observation that the
Church’s “strong commitment to social and economic justice and
collective bargaining was recently affirmed in the . . . Catholic
Bishops’ Pastoral Letter” on the economy.306 However, a more
thorough analysis of the Catholic Church’s social teaching reveals
that the Church’s views are far more complicated than these courts
assume. While the Catholic Church strongly supports worker rights
and collective bargaining, the Church’s vision of collective
bargaining is very different from the framework established in the
NLRA and state labor laws that resemble the federal statute.307
While secular statutes presuppose and entrench an adversarial
relationship between management and labor, the Catholic Church’s
goal is a cooperative relationship based on charity, mutual respect
and concern, and the common good. In an earlier article on religious
organizations and mandatory collective bargaining, I have discussed
differences between the NLRA and the Church’s model in great
detail and have identified several aspects of the national framework
that conflict with Church teaching.308 For example, whereas the
availability, threat, and actual use of economic weapons such as
strikes and lockouts is “part and parcel”309 of the system that the
NLRA sets up, the Church envisions a process of reasoned discussion
305. Culvert, 753 F.2d at 1170.
306. Id. The court was referring to NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS,
ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE
U.S. ECONOMY (10th anniversary ed. 1997) (1986).
307. The first state labor statutes were modeled on the NLRA as originally adopted in
1935. See CHARLES C. KILLINGSWORTH, STATE LABOR RELATIONS ACTS: A STUDY OF
PUBLIC POLICY 1–2 (1948). The original version of the NLRA is commonly referred to as the
Wagner Act, and these first state statutes are known as “little” or “baby” Wagner Acts. See
SANFORD COHEN, STATE LABOR LEGISLATION 1937–1947: A STUDY OF STATE LAWS
AFFECTING THE CONDUCT AND ORGANIZATION OF LABOR UNIONS 4 (1948). Later state
statutes anticipated the amendments to the Wagner Act in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and
helped to shape these changes. See KILLINGSWORTH, supra, at 2–5. For the mutual influence
of state and federal labor statutes upon one another, see generally KILLINGSWORTH, supra.
308. See Brady, supra note 208.
309. NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960).

1684

1BRD-FIN

1633]

12/16/2004 12:33 PM

Religious Organizations and Free Exercise

and cooperation based upon a desire for mutual understanding,
reconciliation, and achievement of the common good.310 In the
Catholic Church’s view, strikes are permissible as an “extreme”311 or
“ultimate”312 means for defending worker rights, but they may never
be abused for the purposes of narrow self-interest,313 and the parties
must “resume negotiations and the discussion of reconciliation” as
soon as possible.314 Likewise, the National Labor Relation Board’s
interpretation of the Act to prohibit promises and grants of benefits
made by employers during an election campaign in order to
discourage a pro-union vote also frustrates the Church’s vision.315
Such a prohibition impedes the genuine attempts at reconciliation
that the Catholic Church encourages as well as the threatening and
misleading gestures feared by the Board.316 Moreover, provisions in
the Act designed to channel all bilateral dealings over working
conditions into collective bargaining or other arms-length
relationships restrict the type of collaboration between labor and
management that the Catholic Church envisions.317 Forcing workers
310. See Brady, supra note 208, at 114–15, 119–122.
311. POPE JOHN PAUL II, LABOREM EXERCENS ¶ 20 (1981), reprinted in CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 352, 381 (David J. O’Brien & Thomas
A. Shannon eds., 1992).
312. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES: PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON
THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD ¶ 68 (1965), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL
THOUGHT, supra note 311, at 166, 212.
313. See LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 311, ¶ 20, at 381; POPE PAUL VI,
OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS ¶ 14 (1971), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra
note 311, at 265, 270.
314. GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 312, ¶ 68, at 212.
315. See Brady, supra note 208, at 122–28. The Board has held that such promises and
grants of benefits violate section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See, e.g., Hudson Hosiery Co., 72
N.L.R.B. 1434, 1436–37 (1947); see also NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 408–
09 (1964) (describing and approving the Board’s position). Section 8(a)(1) is codified at 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2001).
316. According to the Board, promises and grants of benefits during an election
campaign will interfere with employee free choice. In NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., the
Supreme Court explained that employees will interpret promises or grants of benefits as the
equivalent of a threat of reprisal should they choose the union. See Exchange Parts, 375 U.S. at
409. In addition, when employers make promises or grants of benefits, they are not to be
trusted, and any benefits will be fleeting. See id. at 410.
317. See Brady, supra note 208, at 128–38 (discussing section 8(a)(2) of the Act).
Section 8(a)(2) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to “dominate or
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial
or other support to it.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2001). The Act defines a “labor organization”
as “any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan,
in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
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and employers into independent camps on opposite sides of the
bargaining table fosters distrust and division, not the unity that the
Church seeks.318 Thus, while the Church clearly supports collective
bargaining and worker rights, courts upholding the application of
secular labor statutes to Catholic institutions have not recognized
the deep differences between the Church’s vision and the legal
frameworks that these courts have imposed.
The lessons from these cases go even further. If one examines
cases in which Catholic organizations have objected to mandatory
collective bargaining on First Amendment grounds, one will not find
reference to the differences I have described. Church institutions
have not argued that the Catholic vision of collective bargaining is
incompatible with secular regimes. Indeed, in a few cases, Catholic
institutions had been voluntarily bargaining with unions under
secular law for years.319 The absence of the type of argument I have
sketched may, in part, have been strategic. After the Supreme
Court’s decision in Catholic Bishop, Catholic institutions
understandably chose to emphasize the types of issues that the Court
raised in that case.320 However, in many cases, Catholic employers
were probably not aware of the differences that I have described.
Employers may simply not have given the relationship between
secular bargaining regimes and Catholic social teaching extended
examination, or they may have been unfamiliar with secular labor
statutes and, thus, unaware of potential conflicts. Indeed, in my

with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work.” Id. § 152(5). The Board has construed the term
“dealing with” broadly; covered interactions go beyond actual collective bargaining and
include any bilateral processes in which employees make proposals to management and these
proposals are considered by management. See Brady, supra note 208, at 129.
According to the Board, the purpose of section 8(a)(2) is to ensure that labor
organizations that deal with management on working conditions are independent of
management. See id. at 130–31. Section 8(a)(2) is violated whenever an employer dominates,
interferes with, or supports such an organization, such as by creating and structuring the
organization. The effect of section 8(a)(2) is to funnel all bilateral dealing between employers
and employees over working conditions into collective bargaining or some other arm’s-length
relationship. See id. at 130–32.
318. See Brady, supra note 208, at 131–32, 135–38.
319. See Catholic High Sch. Ass’n of the Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161,
1163 (2d Cir. 1985); see also South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the
Infant Jesus Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 716 (N.J. 1997) (explaining that the
diocese had a “past history of collective bargaining with lay high-school teachers”).
320. For further discussion, see Brady, supra note 208, at 140–41.
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earlier article on religious organizations and mandatory collective
bargaining, I discuss several cases in which Catholic employers
unwittingly violated labor statutes when following basic principles of
Catholic social thought in interactions with union members.321 For
these employers, the conflicts between secular law and Catholic
teaching only became apparent as their relationship with union
members unfolded over time.
Thus, courts may have difficulty determining whether
government regulations burden group beliefs or practices because
the religious group itself may be unaware of potential conflicts.
Conflicts between religious doctrine and secular law may exist, but
they may not be visible at the outset to either the church or the
courts. In other cases, courts may be stymied by multiple
interpretations of church doctrine. There are, for example, Catholic
scholars who genuinely believe that collective bargaining under
federal and state law is compatible with the Church’s vision for labor
relations.322 They and I disagree about the proper interpretation of
Catholic social teaching. Sometimes multiple interpretations of
church doctrine are a sign that the group’s beliefs are changing or
developing. In either case, there may be no single authoritative view
but many legitimate positions, all of which represent permissible
interpretations of existing beliefs. Where multiple interpretations of
church doctrine exist, any choice among them will entangle the
courts in religious questions and interfere with the free development
of doctrine. Indeed, the fact that religious doctrine is not static but
develops over time means that government regulation which imposes
no burden today may do so tomorrow, and views which are
unorthodox today or even barely articulable may be authoritative
tomorrow. It will be difficult for courts to recognize and keep up
with such changes particularly where new doctrines are in the early
stages of development or adoption.
Courts may try to address these problems by deferring to the
religious organization regarding its beliefs and burdens on those
beliefs. In theory, courts that exercise such deference will not
become embroiled in religious questions and will give sufficient
321. See id. at 141–44.
322. See, e.g., David L. Gregory, Government Regulation of Religion Through Labor and
Employment Discrimination Laws, 22 STETSON L. REV. 27, 67 (1992); David L. Gregory &
Charles J. Russo, Overcoming NLRB v. Yeshiva University by the Implementation of Catholic
Labor Theory, 41 LAB. L.J. 55, 63 (1990).
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protection when beliefs or practices are infringed. However, while
such deference may reduce the difficulties that courts face, it will not
eliminate them. As discussed above, religious organizations may not
be aware of the ways in which government regulation will impede
their doctrine and practices. Simply deferring to the organization
regarding burdens on religious exercise will not provide sufficient
protection where the organization itself does not fully understand
the relationship between government regulation and church practice.
Moreover, when burdens are later experienced after the application
of secular law, the organization may find it difficult to obtain relief
from the courts particularly if there has been prior unsuccessful
litigation. The reviewing court may be tempted to view later
complaints as a mere pretext for unwillingness to incur the monetary
costs of regulation or other intrusions unrelated to religious matters.
Moreover, because religious doctrine is constantly changing, courts
must be willing to recognize new conflicts where none existed
previously. Courts may be tempted to believe that regulation that is
permissible today will be permissible tomorrow, but this may not be
true. To the extent that courts are slow to recognize change, they
may impede the free development of doctrine and chill the behavior
of members and leaders who will understandably hesitate to promote
changes that will result in prolonged and uncertain litigation.323
Unless courts are truly prepared to defer whenever the religious
organization claims that government regulation interferes with
323. In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), the Supreme Court recognized that similar concerns
about judicial misunderstanding may chill the activities of religious organizations. As discussed
above, the Court in Amos addressed Title VII’s exemption for religious organizations from the
statute’s prohibition on religious discrimination in employment. See supra text accompanying
notes 94–102. While an earlier exemption extended only to the organization’s religious
activities, the current exemption extends to nonreligious activities as well. See id. Those
challenging the exemption argued that the broader provision cannot be justified as an attempt
to alleviate government interference with religious practice because the earlier exemption had
already provided adequate protection. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335–36. The Supreme Court
disagreed. Id. at 336. According to the Court, “it is a significant burden on a religious
organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a
secular court will consider religious.” Id. The Court pointed out that the line between the
group’s religious and nonreligious activities “is hardly a bright one” and that “an organization
might understandably be concerned that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and
sense of mission.” Id. Were this to happen, “[f]ear of potential liability might affect the way an
organization carried out what it understood to be its religious mission.” Id.; see also id. at 343–
44 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the prospect of litigation and
judicial misunderstanding “create the danger of chilling religious activity”).
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religious belief or doctrine, there is a significant chance that judges
will become entangled in religious doctrine and either miss, or be
slow to recognize, substantial burdens.
These examples from cases involving labor and employment
regulation illustrate a basic lesson that is repeated over and over
again in the Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute decisions and yet
again in Smith. Courts are not fit to interpret religious doctrine and
engage in religious questions. As the Court in Watson v. Jones
observed, where civil courts resolve religious questions, the appeal is
“from the more learned tribunal . . . to one which is less so.”324
Thus, whether mandatory collective bargaining conflicts with
Catholic doctrine is not a question that the Second Circuit or any
other court is competent to answer. Nor are courts competent to
measure the burden on religious doctrine when federal
antidiscrimination laws are applied to the employment policies of
conservative Christian schools. Judicial inquiry into the centrality of
religious beliefs as prohibited in Smith is just one impermissible form
of entanglement in church doctrine. The determination of whether
government regulation places a burden on organizational belief and
practice is another.
Indeed, the problem is even more basic. When judges become
entangled in doctrinal questions involving religious denominations
different from their own, they lack the concepts and experiences
necessary to fully understand what is at stake. Faith is not irrational
or nonrational as some scholars have suggested, nor is it completely
impenetrable to outsiders.325 However, faith sheds a light that allows
the believer to see things differently and anew. Where judges do not
share this perspective, they are likely to miss matters of religious or
spiritual significance, and they will also have difficulty recognizing
where their own limitations lie.
Efforts by courts and scholars to carve out special areas of
protection for quintessentially religious matters are no less
problematic. As noted above, courts addressing the application of
antidiscrimination statutes to religious organizations have developed
a ministerial exception that protects the church-minister relationship

324. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1872).
325. See Kathleen A. Brady, Fostering Harmony Among the Justices: How Contemporary
Debates in Theology Can Help To Reconcile the Divisions on the Court Regarding Religious
Expression by the State, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 433, 575 (1999).
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from state interference regardless of whether the organization has a
religious basis for its actions.326 The church-minister relationship is
an area of “prime ecclesiastical concern”327 so “close to the heart of
the church”328 that the state may not interfere even if there is no
doctrinal reason for the discrimination. Interference in the churchminister relationship, by definition, burdens religious practice.
Scholars such as Bagni and Esbeck would expand the sphere of
special protection to include other core religious matters. Bagni’s
“spiritual epicenter” includes membership policies, religious
education, worship, and ritual as well as the relationship between
church and minister.329 For Esbeck, “inherently religious” matters
also include ecclesiastical polity, church discipline, and personnel
decisions where employees are chosen on the basis of religion.330 For
Lupu and Tuttle, the protected zone consists of those aspects of
religious organizations that are “bound up with the sacred”331 and
uniquely distinctive from the temporal and material concerns of the
state.332
At first glance, this approach seems to avoid the concerns raised
in Smith. If it is possible to identify a set of activities that are
inherently or quintessentially religious, judges can protect these areas
from government interference without having to engage in religionspecific analyses that would entangle the courts in religious doctrine
and belief.333 However, there are several difficulties with this
approach. First, the aspects of church life which are uniquely or
quintessentially religious are not obvious. Courts may readily agree
326. See supra notes 111–23 and accompanying text.
327. Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354,
1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir.
1972).
328. Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 1999).
329. See supra text accompanying notes 217–19.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 220–26.
331. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 84.
332. See id. at 92.
333. Indeed, Lupu and Tuttle have defended their approach on this ground. Citing
Smith, Lupu and Tuttle argue that the protected aspects of religious organizations “cannot rest
upon the subjective perceptions of the governed concerning what constitutes the inviolable
core of their faith.” Id. at 83. The majority in Smith recognized that “issues of what lies, or
does not lie, at the centrality of faith for particular believers is beyond judicial competence.” Id.
Instead, Lupu and Tuttle begin with a “political concept of religion,” id., and define protected
matters as those which relate to the “world beyond the temporal and material concerns that are
the proper jurisdiction of the state,” id. at 92.
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that the selection of clergy belongs within this protected zone, and
probably worship and ritual as well, but there will surely be
disagreement about what other matters merit special protection. For
example, while Esbeck has identified church discipline as an
inherently religious matter,334 the Ninth Circuit recently refused to
extend the same protection to disciplinary matters, even decisions
involving clergy. In Bollard v. California Province of the Society of
Jesus,335 the Ninth Circuit addressed a sexual harassment claim by a
Jesuit seminarian under Title VII.336 The seminarian alleged that he
had been sexually harassed on several occasions by his superiors, and
that when he reported the harassment, the order did nothing about
it.337 The court allowed the claim and distinguished disciplinary
decisions regarding clergy from the selection of clergy.338 At least
where a church does not offer a religious reason for the harassment,
the court found that “it stray[ed] too far from the rationale of the
Free Exercise Clause to extend constitutional protection to this sort
of disciplinary inaction simply because a minister is the target as well
as the agent of the harassing activity.”339 Other courts disagree. For
example, in Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland,340 the
Maine Supreme Court held that “[p]astoral supervision is an
ecclesiastical prerogative.”341 The litigation in Swanson involved a
claim against a Catholic diocese for negligent supervision of a priest
who had engaged in sexual misconduct during marital counseling.342
The court held that the claim violated the Free Exercise Clause
because the imposition of secular tort standards on the church’s
relationship with its ministers interferes with “denominational
governance.”343 Thus, in many cases it will not be easy to get
agreement among courts about which aspects of church life should
be specially protected, and when there is controversy and
334. See Esbeck, supra note 221, at 308; Esbeck, supra note 220, at 44–45; Esbeck,
supra note 106, at 397, 420.
335. 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999).
336. See id. at 944.
337. Id.
338. See id. at 946–47.
339. Id. at 947; see also Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 955–58 (9th
Cir. 2004) (following Bollard, 196 F.3d 940).
340. 692 A.2d 441 (Me. 1997).
341. Id. at 445.
342. Id. at 442.
343. Id. at 445.
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uncertainty, courts will almost certainly get drawn into an
examination of religious beliefs and practice.
Another difficulty is that the aspects of church administration
that are quintessentially religious differ from group to group. There
is, in fact, no single category of church functions that is of prime
importance in all traditions. Different religious traditions lodge their
core religious functions in different places, and sensitivity to the
diversity of America’s religious traditions would involve courts in the
type of religion-specific inquiry prohibited in Smith.344 This problem
is illustrated well by federal court decisions applying the ministerial
exception in employment discrimination cases. Courts employing
this exception envision the role of the minister in the church as of
supreme religious importance. The minister is the “lifeblood”345 of
the church and at the “heart of church administration.”346 While this
special status may seem obvious to many in mainline denominations,
it does not fit well with churches that either have no ministers at all
or where the category of minister goes well beyond a select group of
church leaders. For example, in EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist
Theological Seminary,347 the seminary viewed its faculty and
administrative staff as ministers.348 The Fifth Circuit agreed that the
seminary’s faculty should be considered ministers349 but refused to
extend the ministerial exception to include the staff.350 According to
the court, the seminary’s administrative staff does not perform
traditional ecclesiastical functions.351 While the seminary’s
designation of its staff as ministers reflected its belief that they played
a critical role in the school’s religious mission, the court did not
attach the same importance to their jobs. The court was working
with a much narrower conception of minister than the seminary.

344. See supra notes 262–63, 286 and accompanying text.
345. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972); see also Gellington
v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000) (same);
Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946 (same); Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist
Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same).
346. Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363,
1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
347. 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981).
348. Id. at 284–85.
349. Id. at 283–84.
350. Id. at 285.
351. Id. at 284–85.
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Likewise, when teachers in the Christian school operated by the
Shenandoah Baptist Church identified themselves as ministers, the
Fourth Circuit rejected their characterization and distinguished them
from “pastoral staff,” employees with “sacerdotal functions,” and
“church governors.”352 While the teachers in this case taught from a
pervasively religious perspective,353 viewed their jobs as a “personal
ministry,”354 and were employed at an institution that played a
critical role in the church’s evangelizing mission,355 the Fourth
Circuit had a much different picture of the clergy role. Schools like
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary and the elementary and
secondary school operated by Shenandoah Baptist Church reflect a
common belief about ministry in evangelical Protestant
communities. For evangelical Protestants, all church members who
use their gifts to serve the religious mission of the church play a
ministerial role. The roots of this doctrine go back to the
Reformation’s insistence upon “the priesthood of all believers.”
Within this evangelical perspective, protecting only ordained clergy
or employees whose role is similar to those who have been ordained
misunderstands basic church polity. All members who serve the
church are its lifeblood; all play an essential role in its religious
mission.
To be sure, federal courts have been careful to expand the
category of minister beyond ordained clergy to others who perform
ministerial functions. Many courts have adopted the definition
suggested by Bruce Bagni and include any employee whose “primary
duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance,
supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in
religious ritual and worship.”356 This inquiry is designed to
“determine whether a position is important to the spiritual and
pastoral mission of the church.”357 However, Bagni’s definition is
still relatively narrow and reflects a familiar, but by no means
352. Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1396 (4th Cir. 1990).
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1391–92.
356. Bagni, supra note 106, at 1545, quoted in EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,
461 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985); Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (D. Colo. 1994).
357. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; see also Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801 (quoting Rayburn);
Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 461 (same).
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universal, view of ministers as employees with leadership or worship
roles, or direct responsibilities for the spread of the church’s
message. The administrative staff at Southwestern Baptist
Theological Seminary would not be included even if their work is
essential to the success of the institution’s religious mission. Nor
would other employees who serve religious organizations in
nonsupervisory and nonteaching roles.
Such a narrow understanding of essential ecclesiastical functions
is also incompatible with Roman Catholic polity. While the Catholic
Church is one of the most hierarchical of all Christian
denominations, the Catholic Church does not limit essential
religious functions to ordained clergy or those with similar
leadership, teaching, or worship roles. For example, in the Catholic
Church’s social mission, those who feed and counsel the needy also
proclaim the Church’s message just as much as do preachers from
the pulpit.358 For many scholars, the social services activities of
religious organizations are viewed as less purely or quintessentially
religious than teaching and worship. For example, Bagni places social
services operations outside the spiritual epicenter and closer to the
secular world than core religious functions.359 Esbeck has also
described social services activities as a “second tier of religious
ministry” that is “more the outgrowth of truths held by religious
faiths than they are centrally dealing with the particulars of one’s
perception of ultimate truth.”360 For the Catholic Church, this is a
misunderstanding of the Christian message. When Christ reveals
God’s love for humanity on the cross, he invites others to share in

358. POPE PAUL VI, EVANGELII NUNTIANDI §§ 15, 21 (1975), reprinted in CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 311, at 303, 307–08, 310–11; ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL,
supra note 306, §§ 45–47, at 25–26.
359. See Bagni, supra note 106, at 1539–40.
360. Esbeck, supra note 106, at 377. In its recent decision in Catholic Charities of
Sacramento v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004), the California Supreme Court went
much further and found that the relationship between a Catholic social services agency and its
employees, many of whom were non-Catholics, was not a matter of internal church governance
protected under the U.S. Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute precedents. Id. at 77. The
court distinguished Catholic Charities of Sacramento from a church and described it as a
“nonprofit public benefit corporation.” Id. While lower courts in the labor and employment
area have routinely described the operations of religiously affiliated social services agencies as
essentially secular, they have not suggested that these organizations fall outside the ambit of
the Court’s intrachurch dispute cases.
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his life by imitating this love.361 Serving the poor and needy is not a
second tier expression of one’s faith. It is part and parcel of the
Gospel message. Indeed, it is the Christian message in deed as well as
word. When church members serve their neighbors in need, they
follow, model, and witness the love of God. Thus, within the work
of the counselor, the administrator, and even the cook there is the
essence of the Catholic Church’s teaching.362
Even if the ministerial exception is appropriately limited to
leadership, worship, and teaching roles, the courts have had difficulty
in expanding their vision beyond familiar clergy jobs to include all
employees with primary responsibilities for teaching the church’s
message. If one examines the outcomes of federal circuit court
opinions involving the ministerial exception, one will find that the
courts have not strayed far from traditional clerical positions.
Employees identified as ministerial have included ordained clergy,363
seminary faculty,364 a pastoral associate,365 a diocesan

361. See Kathleen A. Brady, Catholic Social Thought and the Public Square: Deconstructing
the Demand for Public Accessibility, 1 VILL. J. CATHOLIC SOC. THOUGHT 203, 208–09
(2004).
362. According to the California Supreme Court in Catholic Charities, Catholic Charities
acknowledged in its complaint that “[t]he corporate purpose of [the organization] is not the
direct inculcation of religious values.” Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 75. See supra note 360
for a discussion of this case. This statement is misleading, and it contributed to the court’s
misunderstanding. While Catholic social services agencies may not teach religious values
explicitly, they do so by example. Indeed, Catholic Charities recognized its central
responsibility for fostering the Church’s values when it described its purpose as to “promote a
just, compassionate society” that supports human dignity. Catholic Charities, 85 P.2d at 75.
Moreover, the fact that Catholic Charities has invited non-Catholics to join its work and
receive its services does not undermine this religious purpose or its expression of the Catholic
faith. According to the California court, the relationship between Catholic Charities and its
employees, most of whom do not belong to the Catholic Church, is not an internal church
matter. Id. at 76–78. The court misunderstands. While Catholic Charities has invited nonCatholics to share in its religious mission, it retains the authority to decide what this mission is
and to ensure that all relationships within the organization appropriately reflect its religious
values.
363. See Werft v. Desert Southwest Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church,
377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203
F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United
Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal
Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991); Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of
United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460
F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); cf. Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21
F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994) (probationary minister).
364. See EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir.
1981).
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communications manager,366 a professor of canon law at a Catholic
university,367 and music directors and teachers.368 Excluded from the
ministerial exception have been faculty at a pervasively religious
Christian college369 and lay teachers in church-operated elementary
and secondary schools.370 Indeed, except for theology and music
teachers,371 no federal court has included lay teachers at religiously
affiliated schools within the ministerial exception.372 In its landmark
Establishment Clause decision, Lemon v. Kurtzman,373 the Supreme
Court found that lay teachers in parochial schools play a critical role
in disseminating religious beliefs and doctrine and that religion is
intertwined with secular instruction.374 The Court in Catholic Bishop
repeated these observations.375 Nevertheless, lower courts applying
the ministerial exception have largely bypassed these precedents as
they have concluded that the educational responsibilities of lay
teachers are not sufficiently religious to qualify them as ministers.
365. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th
Cir. 1985).
366. See Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003).
367. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
368. See EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000)
(music director and music teacher at a church-operated school); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d
173 (5th Cir. 1999) (choirmaster and director of music).
369. See EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
370. See Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir.
1993); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993); Dole v. Shenandoah
Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d
1362 (9th Cir. 1986).
371. In Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994), a federal district court held
that a theology teacher at a Catholic school is covered by the ministerial exception. Cf. CurayCramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, No. CIV.A.03-1014-KAJ, 2004 WL 2632958 (D. Del.
Nov. 16, 2004) (suggesting but not deciding that a religion teacher at a parochial school falls
within the ministerial exception). In Raleigh, the Fourth Circuit found that a music teacher at a
Catholic school functioned as a minister. Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 804–05. State courts have also
identified school principals as ministerial employees. See, e.g., Sabatino v. Saint Aloysius Parish,
672 A.2d 217 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Pardue v. Ctr. City Consortium Sch. of the
Archdiocese of Wash., No. 02-5459, 2003 WL 21753776 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 29, 2003).
372. But see Gabriel v. Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church, 640 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994). In Gabriel, a lower state court addressed a claim for breach of contract brought by a
kindergarten teacher against a church-operated school, and the court held that the teacher was a
ministerial employee whose employment was an ecclesiastical issue into which civil courts could not
intervene. I have found no other case, state or federal, which has held that lay teachers in churchoperated schools fall within the ministerial exception or otherwise qualify as ministerial employees.
373. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
374. See id. at 616–19.
375. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 501–03 (1979).
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The difficulty with any judicial or scholarly line drawing between
core religious matters and less sensitive functions goes even further.
For some denominations, there is simply no line that can be drawn
between religious and nonreligious functions. Everything that goes
on within the organization is suffused with religious significance.
Where the outsider sees routine or secular matters, the church
members see important religious activity. Again, the Catholic
Church provides a good example. In state and lower federal court
cases upholding the application of labor statutes to religiously
affiliated social services programs and schools, the courts have been
confident that collective bargaining requirements will not interfere
with religious practice. According to these courts, because religiously
affiliated social services organizations function just like nonreligious
charitable enterprises and are essentially secular in their operations,
any intrusion on religious matters will be minimal.376 In the context
of church-operated schools, the courts have held that interference
with religious matters can be avoided if bargaining is limited to
wages, hours, and other secular terms of employment.377
However, where Catholic organizations are involved, such a
division between secular and religious activities is not possible. For
the Catholic Church, the entire inner life of the religious community
must model and witness the Gospel principles of charity,
cooperation, and mutual concern.378 The Catholic Church and its
institutions are to be an example and an instrument of a new kind of
social life built upon the love of Christ and unifying all persons with
God and one another.379 Thus, while the operations of Catholic
social services organizations may appear to be essentially secular, they
are, in fact, suffused with religious significance. Not only are the
activities of service programs a response to and imitation of God’s
love demonstrated on the cross, but the very internal life and social
relations within the community are a sign and witness of this love.
Catholic communities proclaim the Gospel message through their
work and their communal life. Justice Brennan recognized the
quintessentially religious character of such social services programs in
376. See supra notes 150–55 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 173, 178, and accompanying text.
378. See Brady, Catholic Social Thought, supra note 361, at 219–20; Brady, supra note
208, at 112–13.
379. See Brady, Catholic Social Thought, supra note 361, at 219–20; Brady, supra note
208, at 112–13.
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his concurrence in Amos. According to Justice Brennan, “[c]hurches
often regard the provision of such services as a means of fulfilling
religious duty and of providing an example of the way of life a
church seeks to foster.”380 For the Catholic Church, social services
activities are no more secular than worship and preaching.
Nor will limiting collective bargaining to wages, hours, and other
secular terms of employment solve the problem. In labormanagement relations, like all social relations, the Catholic Church
seeks collaboration and cooperation and rejects adversarialism.381
Requiring the Church to bargain under secular bargaining regimes
that presuppose and entrench an adversarial relationship between
labor and management will undermine the Church’s ability to live
out its religious beliefs. Even if bargaining is limited to secular terms
of employment, the process of bargaining under secular regimes
remains incompatible with the church’s doctrine and practice. Where
all the relationships within a religious organization are suffused with
religious significance as in the Catholic context, disentangling the
secular from the religious is simply not possible.
Thus, the only effective and workable protection for the ability of
religious groups to preserve, transmit, and develop their beliefs free
from government interference is a broad right of church autonomy
that extends to all aspects of church affairs. While in theory it may be
preferable to grant relief only in situations where religious doctrine
or practice is actually burdened, Smith prohibits the type of judicial
inquiry that such an approach would require, and existing case law
demonstrates that judges are not able to identify such burdens
accurately. Line drawing between quintessentially religious activities
and activities that are less critical to the religious mission is similarly
problematic. It is by no means clear where such a line should be
drawn, and, moreover, there is no single line that fits all religious
organizations. For some organizations, like the Catholic Church, no
such line exists at all. Thus, the only approach to government
regulation of religious groups that is fully consistent with the lessons
in Smith is a right of autonomy that extends to all matters of church
administration, not just those with core religious significance and not
just those that are demonstrably burdened by the state.

380. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
381. See supra notes 308–18 and accompanying text.
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C. Religious Belief and Democratic Government

At this point, the reader might object to the direction of my
argument. If limiting relief to identifiable burdens on religious belief
and practice is not possible and no line can be drawn between
quintessentially religious matters and less significant practices, the
lesson of Smith is to abandon special protections for religious groups
altogether. The Smith Court reached that conclusion in the context
of individual religious exercise when it found that judges were unfit
to determine when government action burdens practices central to
individual believers.382 Why should the outcome be different with
respect to religious groups? I have argued above that full freedom of
religious belief requires at least some special protections for groups,
but perhaps that was the wrong starting point. After all, Smith does
not guarantee a diversity of religious perspectives or that religious
belief will be unaffected by government action. Smith states that
government may not regulate beliefs as such, but the decision
requires nothing further. The Smith Court may envision a world of
diverse religious beliefs unimpeded by government action, but it did
nothing to ensure such an environment. Moreover, while it might be
desirable, in the abstract, to provide strong protections for religious
belief and the groups that shape and sustain belief, there are
countervailing state policies at stake when neutral laws of general
applicability are involved. At this point, the reader should recall Ira
Lupu’s observation that the internal affairs of religious groups can
have substantial effects upon the larger society, sometimes quite
negative, and, thus, the state has important interests in extending
neutral regulation to religious groups.383 While the internal affairs of
religious groups may not affect the external affairs of the larger
community directly, they often do so indirectly. When religious
organizations shape attitudes, moral convictions, and behavior in the
larger society, as they frequently do, what goes on within the
organizations has important consequences for those outside the
group.384 A broad right of church autonomy provides little
protection when these consequences are harmful, and the religious
organization prevails even in situations where there is no burden on
religious belief and practice. Why should protections for religious
382. See supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text.
383. See Lupu, supra note 64, at 408–09.
384. See id.
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belief necessarily trump countervailing state policies except in narrow
cases where the group’s behavior directly harms outsiders? Perhaps
the readiness of lower courts to find compelling state interests when
employment and labor laws burden group belief and practice reflects
an important reality that supporters of a broad right of church
autonomy ignore. Church autonomy comes at a cost, and given this
cost, why is such a right desirable?
On this question as well, Smith provides important guidance. In
the framework that Smith establishes for individual religious exercise,
democratic processes play the central role in protecting religious
liberty. The Free Exercise Clause does not guarantee relief where
individual practice is burdened by neutral state action, but citizens
can and, when reasonable, should extend such protection through
legislative accommodations.
The faith that Smith places in democratic government invites
consideration of the conditions that are necessary for its flourishing.
If strong protections for individual religious belief and the groups
that nurture and sustain belief are critical for successful democratic
government, a broad right of church autonomy should certainly be
preferred over the alternative of no special protections at all. Many
scholars in recent years have emphasized the importance of religious
groups and other voluntary associations for sustaining a wellfunctioning democratic order. Religious groups are among the
“mediating structures” or institutions of “civil society” that stand
between the individual and the state and transmit the values, skills,
and attitudes necessary for self-government.385 As the source of
moral values, they function as “seedbeds of civic virtue.”386 As
training grounds for the exercise of democratic skills and

385. Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus popularized the term “mediating
structures.” PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM
STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 158 (Michael Novak ed., 2d ed. 1996). The term “civil society” is
also very common in recent literature. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming,
Foreword: Legal and Constitutional Implications of the Calls To Revive Civil Society, 75 CHI.KENT L. REV. 289, 289 (2000).
386. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 109 (1991); Linda C. McLain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for
Civil Society-Revivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 309–10 (2000); Yael Tamir, Revisiting
the Civic Sphere, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 214, 218 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998); see also
SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY (Mary Ann Glendon & David Blankenhorn eds., 1995).
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responsibilities, they are “schools for democracy.”387 However, for
many scholars who have emphasized the importance of associational
life in the democratic order, this critical role does not call for strong
protections against state interference. To the contrary, the state has
an important role in shaping the internal affairs of religious and other
civic groups so that they are congruent with democratic norms and
shared public values.388 These scholars fear minority groups who
teach “illiberal” values that will destabilize rather than strengthen
democratic government.389 Too much diversity in associational life is
not a good thing when this diversity undermines our common civic
culture.390
For those who desire congruence between the internal affairs of
civil society institutions and shared public values, full freedom of
religious belief is not desirable nor are strong protections for
religious group autonomy. These scholars do not want to “bend
over backwards” to protect minority religious groups from state
interference where these groups do not support common civic
387. BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 385, at 194; see also McClain & Fleming, supra
note 386, at 309–11; Tamir, supra note 386, at 218.
388. As Amy Gutmann has written:
A government that is constitutionally dedicated to liberal democratic principles has a
strong interest in supporting a vast assortment of associational activities among its
citizens. But it also has a strong interest in regulating associations so that they
support a liberal democratic form of government and public policies that are
consistent with liberal democratic principles.
Amy Gutmann, Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION,
supra note 386, at 18; see also STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC
EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 108, 151, 134–35, 277 (2000) [hereinafter
MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST]; Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary Associations
and Democratic Governance, 20 POL. & L. SOC’Y 393, 394–95 (1992); Stephen Macedo,
Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal
Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417, 428, 432, 440–41, 451 (2000); Stephen Macedo,
The Constitution, Civic Virtue, and Civil Society: Social Capital as Substantive Morality, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1573–74, 1592–93 (2001). For discussions of scholarship
advocating this position, see NANCY ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE
PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA 36–41 (1998), and Tamir, supra note 386, at
220–22. Both Rosenblum and Tamir disagree with those who favor using the power of the
state to achieve congruence between the internal values of groups and public values. See
ROSENBLUM, supra, at 47–65, 349–50; Tamir, supra note 386, at 215, 222–26. For others
criticizing the demand for congruence, see William A. Galston, Civil Society, Civic Virtue, and
Liberal Democracy, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 603, 604–05 (2000).
389. See MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 388, at 197; see also Tamir,
supra note 386, at 222 (discussing such fear).
390. See MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 388, at 2, 34, 134–35, 146–
47, 219.
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values.391 Like Lupu in his earlier work,392 they emphasize the ways in
which the internal affairs of religious groups can have harmful effects
on the larger society, and rather than broad autonomy, they
welcome regulation that shapes, molds, and constitutes religious and
other groups according to shared public values. A number of legal
scholars who have written about religious group rights in the context
of labor and employment laws share this position. Pointing to the
role that religious groups play in shaping culture and transmitting
values,393 these scholars have argued that employment discrimination
within religious organizations threatens a “culture of subordination”
that harms outsiders as well as members.394 Discrimination by
religious institutions “send[s] a powerful social message”395 and
“imbeds . . . prejudice in American culture.”396 Labor conflicts,
particularly in educational institutions, also impart the wrong
values.397 The state’s interest in enforcing labor and employment
regulation is, therefore, very strong.398 The Fifth Circuit in EEOC v.
Mississippi College.399 summarized this view well when it held that the
state’s interest in eradicating discrimination justified application of
Title VII to faculty positions at a pervasively religious Christian
college.400 According to the court,
Although the number of religious educational institutions is minute
in comparison to the number of employers subject to Title VII,
their effect upon society at large is great because of the role they
play in educating society’s young. If the environment in which such
institutions seek to achieve their religious and educational goals
reflects unlawful discrimination, those discriminatory attitudes will

391. Id. at 147, 197.
392. See supra notes 249–52 and accompanying text.
393. See Brant, supra note 64, at 277–78; Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary
Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1091–93, 1114 (1996).
394. Rutherford, supra note 393, at 1114, 1123.
395. Brant, supra note 64, at 277.
396. Rutherford, supra note 393, at 1091.
397. See Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, The Application of Labor Relations and Discrimination
Statutes to Lay Teachers at Religious Schools: The Establishment Clause and the Pretext Inquiry,
64 ALB. L. REV. 629, 671, 674 (2000).
398. See Brant, supra note 64, at 278; Rutherford, supra note 393, at 1116, 1121–23;
Tenenbaum, supra note 397, at 671, 673–74.
399. 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
400. Id. at 488–89.
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be perpetuated with an influential segment of society, the
detrimental effect of which cannot be estimated.401

All of these scholars misunderstand the proper relationship
between religious groups and democratic government. Democratic
government is not supported best by homogeneity of beliefs and
values, even beliefs whose correctness seems unassailable and values
that seem essential for democratic life. Shaping associational life so
that the internal practices and values of religious groups and other
mediating institutions match shared public norms stifles new ideas
that could challenge prevailing perspectives in progressive directions.
Where government regulation inhibits the preservation, transmission,
and development of minority beliefs within religious communities
and other civic groups, it disserves democracy, not serves it. Full
freedom of belief, even unpopular and unorthodox belief, is essential
to the health of democratic society as are the groups that make such
beliefs possible. If democratic majorities were permitted to entrench
prevailing values by intruding upon the internal practices of
institutions that promote alternative views, improvements in the
status quo would be difficult to make and errors would go
unchallenged. Without unorthodox ideas, society will stagnate. The
dangers are especially grave when democratic majorities are given
primary responsibility for protecting individual liberties as they are in
Smith.402 While it may be preferable in theory to protect only positive
alternatives and new ideas that are helpful rather than harmful,
humility requires us to admit that we do not always know where
today’s errors lie or where tomorrow’s advances are hidden.
A number of other scholars have also defended the importance of
religious group freedom in a democratic society. Religious groups
and other civic associations are buffers against overweening state
power.403 Religious groups enhance individual autonomy by
providing the context for personal development and expression.404
Religious groups can also provide a realm of privacy, intimacy, and

401. Id. at 489.
402. See supra notes 264–67 and accompanying text.
403. See Esbeck, supra note 220, at 53, 67–68; Garnett, supra note 270, at 1853;
Gedicks, supra note 106, at 115, 158; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 40, 84.
404. See Gedicks, supra note 106, at 115–16, 158; see also Tamir, supra note 386, at 215.
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supportive social bonds.405 In addition, religious groups mark the
limits of state jurisdiction by addressing spiritual matters that lie
beyond the temporal concerns of government.406
My view goes further. Religious groups do not just check the
power of the state, provide a context for individual development and
communal support, or address extratemporal matters. Nor do they
simply transmit important values and skills essential for democratic
self-government, though they certainly do play all of these roles.
Rather, for many religious groups, spiritual matters have much to say
about the shape of the temporal order. Religious communities with
prophetic traditions speak to the state and its citizens about the
content of laws, the distribution of wealth and power, and the
requirements of justice. Gerard Bradley has written that “[i]t is
precisely the lot of a church to live by norms unsuited to organize a
polity acting in history.”407 This is only partly true. Of course, no
political system can mirror the relationships and structures
appropriate within a church. However, for many religious traditions,
including the Catholic tradition discussed above, the norms of the
church are viewed as a guide for the norms of politics. The Catholic
Church, as I observed, views its own internal life as a model for social
relationships in the larger community, including relationships
between labor and management. For the Catholic Church, the
cooperative vision of collective bargaining that it advocates is not
intended solely for its own institutions. To the contrary, it promotes
this vision as the standard that should guide political decision makers
and commercial actors as well. Indeed, the Church’s contemporary
teaching on social issues began with a document designed to address
the desperate condition of the working classes and the clash between
capital and labor at the height of the industrial revolution.408 The
Church believes that only the Gospel message can provide the
405. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 7, at 1311–13; Galston, supra note 388, at 604;
Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001,
1072–75 (1983); Tamir, supra note 386, at 215.
406. See Gerard V. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of
Church and State?, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1084–87 (1989); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at
40, 84, 92; Smith, supra note 216, at 1017–18.
407. Bradley, supra note 406, at 1087.
408. This document, Rerum Novarum, was issued in 1891 by Pope Leo XIII and
inaugurated the contemporary Catholic social thought tradition. See POPE LEO XIII, RERUM
NOVARUM ¶¶ 1–3 (1891), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 311, at 14–
15.
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“genuine solution” to these and other social problems.409 Indeed,
“the new command of love” displayed on the cross, modeled in the
communal life of the church, and imitated in the Church’s works of
mercy is not only “the basic law of human perfection” but also “of
the world’s transformation.”410 The Church looks forward to a
renewed social order that reflects411 and foreshadows412 the kingdom
of God.
Indeed, it is activist religious traditions such as these that have
contributed much to the development of America’s political culture
over the course of its history. Judge John Noonan has observed that
religious “crusades” played an indispensable role in ending slavery
and in the fight for civil rights a century later.413 Nothing guarantees
that religious crusades will be for the good, writes Judge Noonan.414
Nor have any succeeded without conflict.415 However, much would
have been lost without their contributions to the formation of
American civic culture and political values. Though the ideals of
religious crusades were at one time unpopular and unorthodox, and
even abhorrent to many,416 many were, in fact, seeds of progress.
Thus, democratic government flourishes best when religious
communities are free to develop, teach, and practice their religious
beliefs and doctrines without government interference, no matter
how unpopular or even repugnant their ideas may seem. The
alternative perspectives and ways of life that religious groups
communicate and model are the source of new ideas that make
change and progress possible. Diversity of religious belief and
associational life are good things in a democracy, and they would not
be possible without strong protections for religious groups. Lupu
409. POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS ¶ 5 (1991), reprinted in CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 311, at 439, 443. For further discussion, see Brady, supra note
361, at 215–21.
410. GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 312, ¶ 38, at 188.
411. See JOHN PAUL II, SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS ¶ 48 (1987), reprinted in
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 311, at 395, 430.
412. See GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 312, ¶ 39, at 189; LABOREM EXERCENS, supra
note 311, ¶ 27, at 389; OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, supra note 313, ¶ 37, at 278.
413. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 250–52, 256–58 (1998).
414. See id. at 250.
415. See id. at 258–60.
416. See id. at 251 (discussing the “antislavery crusade” that “angered and alienated and
frightened the slaveholding South into rebellion”); id. at 257–58 (describing resentment
generated by the civil rights movement).
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and others are correct to point out that religious groups play an
important role in shaping the larger public culture and values. It is
for this reason that these groups must be protected from state
interference rather than molded according to majoritarian values.
Anything else would be shortsighted and harmful not only to the
religious community but also to the larger society.
At this point the reader might raise a further concern. I may have
demonstrated that strong protections for religious belief and the
groups that nourish these beliefs are important for democratic selfgovernment, but my argument applies equally well to nonreligious
associations. Just like religious groups, nonreligious organizations
may advocate and model new perspectives for social and political life.
Why, then, the reader may ask, should religious groups receive
greater protection from government interference than nonreligious
groups enjoy? Indeed, as I observed above, many scholars in recent
years have questioned the fairness of special protections for religious
organizations. If religious and nonreligious groups both provide
important benefits to individuals and society, why should religious
groups receive more favorable treatment?417
The proper response to this concern is not to diminish
protections for religious organizations but to expand them for
secular associations that play similar roles in the lives of individuals
and the larger community. Currently, the right of association under
the Speech Clause provides considerable protections for groups that
engage in expressive activities, including the transmission of values.418
The Supreme Court has consistently stated that where a law
interferes with the internal structures or affairs of expressive
associations and, as a result, significantly impairs the ability of the
group to advocate its chosen message, the First Amendment requires
relief unless application of the law is justified by a compelling state
interest.419 According to the Court, government interference need
not be intentional to violate the Constitution.420 In either case,
417. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 7, at 1283; Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation,
supra note 7, at 574; Gedicks, Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, supra note 7, at 926–27; Lupu
& Tuttle, supra note 106, at 39–40, 67–68 (describing this position).
418. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648–50 (2000); Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622–23 (1984). The Supreme Court precedent also provides strong
protections for “intimate” associations that provide supportive contexts for personal
development and social bonds. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 617–20.
419. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648; Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622–23.
420. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
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protections are necessary to “preserv[e] political and cultural
diversity”421 and to prevent the majority from “imposing its views on
groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas.”422
While most of the Court’s decisions have dealt with laws affecting
membership and leadership choices,423 impermissible intrusions on
internal affairs may take other forms as well. Regulation of leadership
or membership decisions is just an “example,” though a “clear[]”
example, of unconstitutional interference.424
The protection that nonreligious groups currently receive under
the right of association is considerable, but it is not as expansive as
the broad right of autonomy that I have defended for religious
organizations. Indeed, the Court’s approach to the right of
association strongly resembles the more moderate option for
religious group rights that I have rejected above as unworkable. Just
as religious groups under this option receive relief from government
regulation only when the regulation burdens religious belief or
practice, expressive associations are currently entitled to exemptions
from government regulation only when it significantly affects or
alters the group’s message.
In my view, a broad right of autonomy should be extended to
nonreligious associations where possible. Just as religious groups play
an important role in democratic government, so do nonreligious
associations with expressive purposes. Moreover, some of the same
problems that make limiting relief to actual burdens unworkable in
the religious context also arise where the group’s beliefs are
nonreligious. Under the Court’s current approach to freedom of
association, judges must determine when government action
significantly impairs or alters the group’s message. Unfamiliarity with
the message and the temptation to reach desirable results can lead to
misunderstanding and error in a secular context just as in a religious
one.

421. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622.
422. Dale, 530 U.S. at 647–48.
423. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 640; N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1
(1988); Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Jaycees, 468 U.S. at
609.
424. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623; see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (“Government actions that
may unconstitutionally burden this freedom may take many forms, one of which is ‘intrusion
into the internal structure or affairs of an association’ like a ‘regulation that forces the group to
accept members it does not desire.’” (quoting Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623)).
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The Court’s recent decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.425
illustrates these dangers well. In Dale, the Boy Scouts sought
exemption from a New Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation in places of public association.426 The
litigation in Dale arose when the Boy Scouts revoked the adult
membership of James Dale, an openly homosexual assistant
scoutmaster.427 The Boy Scouts argued that Dale’s readmittance
would interfere with its expression because homosexual conduct is
not consistent with the values it seeks to teach young people.428 The
majority gave deference to the Boy Scouts’ description of its message
and its views about what would impair this message429 and concluded
that application of the law would violate the group’s associational
rights.430 Four justices, led by Justice Stevens, dissented and strongly
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion and its deference to the Boy
Scouts’ claims.431 According to the dissent, the majority should have
engaged in an “independent analysis” of the group’s message and
the burden imposed by the New Jersey law,432 and it should have
required the Boy Scouts to demonstrate a “clear, unequivocal”
position regarding homosexuality.433 Delving into the Boy Scouts’
internal and public statements regarding homosexuality in great
detail, the dissent found no clear, shared stance regarding
homosexuality.434 To the contrary, the dissent found it
“exceptionally clear” that the Boy Scouts did not have a shared
message disapproving of homosexuality.435
The dissenting opinion in Dale is a masterful deconstruction of
the Boy Scouts’ argument. Turning the Boy Scouts’ statements
against one another, the dissent goes far in undermining the Boy
Scouts’ description of its own beliefs and in convincing the reader
that the Boy Scouts does not really endorse the position that the

425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
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530 U.S. 640 (2000).
Id. at 643–46.
Id. at 644.
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Id. at 653.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 685–86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 686.
Id. at 687–88.
Id. at 684–85.
Id. at 684.
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group has adopted consistently since 1978 and advocated publicly in
litigation and other settings.436 The dissent’s opinion is as troubling
as it is brilliant. Giving no deference to the association’s assertions
regarding its own beliefs and expression, the dissenting justices
essentially turn the Boy Scouts’ position on its head, and one is left
wondering whether the justices’ true motivation was reaching a
desirable result. The majority stops short of making such an
accusation, but the suggestion lies just beneath the surface.
Criticizing the New Jersey Supreme Court for reaching the same
conclusion as the dissent, the Court stated that “it is not the role of
the courts to reject a group’s expressed values because they disagree
with those values or find them internally inconsistent.”437 We must
not, the majority later cautions, be
guided by our views of whether the Boy Scouts’ teachings with
respect to homosexual conduct are right or wrong; public or
judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization’s expression does
not justify the State’s effort to compel the organization to accept
members where such acceptance would derogate from the
organization’s expressive message.438

Regardless of whether the dissent did succumb to that temptation,
the danger was clearly present, and the dissent’s claim that its
conclusions were “exceptionally clear” was certainly wrong. The
disagreement between the majority and dissent in this case
demonstrates that it is not always easy for judges to interpret the
messages of expressive associations or ascertain when government
action burdens those messages. This is especially so where the
group’s beliefs are uncommon or unpopular, not fully logical or
coherent, in the process of development, or otherwise lacking the
clarity and consistency that the dissent would like to see. The
deference that the majority supports would be helpful, but
opportunities for misunderstanding will remain, as will temptations
to misconstrue. When mistakes are made, the costs are high for both
the group and the larger society. When government suppresses or
alters the messages of its expressive associations, the diversity of
voices in the community is diminished.
436. For a short chronology of the Boy Scouts’ internal and public statements regarding
homosexuality, see id. at 651–53 (majority opinion).
437. Id. at 651.
438. Id. at 661.
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How far protections for group autonomy should extend under
the right of association is a more difficult issue. Special problems
arise in the context of nonreligious associations that are not present
in the case of religious organizations. Except in the rare case where a
religious organization operates a commercial enterprise,439 most, if
not all, of the activities of religious groups are bound up with First
Amendment purposes. By contrast, the range of nonreligious
associations that engage in some sort of expressive activity is
extensive and includes many groups with significant commercial
activities or other nonexpressive functions. Chapters of the United
States Jaycees and Rotary Clubs, which were the subject of two
important Supreme Court decisions under the right of association in
the 1980s, are examples.440 Thus, if all secular associations engaging
in expressive activities were exempted from government regulation
whenever it affects internal group affairs, much of the economic life
of the community would be beyond state control, including the
nonexpressive activities of organizations with significant commercial
purposes. For this reason, a broad right of autonomy for all
nonreligious organizations that engage in expressive association may
not be feasible.
How an expanded right of expressive association might be
structured and which organizations should be covered is beyond the
scope of this paper. Justice O’Connor has suggested drawing a
distinction between organizations that are primarily engaged in
expressive activities and those in which commercial or other
nonexpressive purposes predominate, and she would accord the
former broad protections unavailable to the latter.441 One might
follow Justice O’Connor’s lead and extend a broad right of
autonomy to those associations in which expressive purposes
predominate. Other organizations would still have to show a burden
on their expression to receive relief. Such an approach seems
promising, and it would target strong protections to the type of
group most likely to supply new perspectives to public discussion and

439. Such operations are beyond the scope of this Article. Greater regulation would be
permissible where religious groups operate commercial enterprises.
440. See Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 539–41, 548–49
(1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612–14 (1984); id. at 638–40
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
441. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 631–40 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
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debate. However, whether this approach is, in fact, fair and workable
would require further analysis. My purpose here is simply to point us
in the right direction. Our goal should, indeed, be greater equality
for religious and nonreligious associations, but this goal should be
achieved by expanding protections for nonreligious groups rather
than diminishing protections for religious groups.
To the extent that some differences remain between the
treatment of religious and nonreligious groups, these differences
need not be troubling. I have argued that the similar roles that
religious and nonreligious groups play in democratic society justify
strong protections for both, but these protections need not be
exactly the same. The right of association under the Speech Clause is
a different constitutional guarantee than the Free Exercise Clause,
and the structure and details of the freedoms afforded under these
two clauses will reflect that fact.
Moreover, the Court has never required identical treatment for
religion and nonreligion. For many contemporary scholars, religious
belief and activity are no longer distinguishable from strongly-held
nonreligious convictions.442 However, our constitutional regime
reflects a contrary view. As many scholars have pointed out, the very
existence of constitutional provisions dedicated exclusively to
religion demonstrate that religion is distinctive in our constitutional
framework.443 The Supreme Court’s decisions also support this
distinctiveness. For example, in Smith, the Court permitted and,
indeed, encouraged special legislative accommodations where

442. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 7, at 1262–66; Gedicks, Defensible Free Exercise
Doctrine, supra note 7, at 926–27; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 39, 67–68
(describing this development).
443. See Kent Greenawalt, Freedom of Association and Religious Association, in FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 386, at 109, 122; Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra
note 7, at 314; Laycock, Remnants of Free Exercise, supra note 7, at 16; Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and Response to the Critics, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 685, 717 (1992); McConnell, Singling Out Religion, supra note 7, at 9.
Laycock writes:
Religion is unlike other human activities, or at least the founders thought so. The
proper relation between religion and government was a subject of great debate in
the founding generation, and the Constitution includes two clauses that apply to
religion and do not apply to anything else. This debate and these clauses presuppose
that religion is in some way a special human activity, requiring special rules
applicable only to it.
Laycock, Remnants of Free Exercise, supra note 7, at 16.
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government action burdens individual religious exercise.444 In Amos,
the Court held that similar legislative accommodations for religious
groups do not violate the Establishment Clause even if nonreligious
groups do not receive the same benefits. According to the Court, “it
has never indicated that statutes that give special consideration to
religious groups are per se invalid.”445 Rather, “[w]here, as here,
government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that
burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the
exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular entities.”446
While the Court’s decisions in recent years may be more “neutralist”
than in the past, they do not embrace a thoroughgoing neutralism
that treats religion and nonreligion exactly alike. Indeed, just last
term in Locke v. Davey,447 the Court rejected such a view and
expressly reaffirmed the distinctive treatment of religion under the
First Amendment.448
So far, I have offered a justification for protecting religious
groups that should appeal to believers and nonbelievers alike.
Religious groups and the ideas they generate are an important source
of new perspectives for social and political life, and the same role
played by nonreligious groups justifies strong protections for them as
well. For many scholars, a defense of free exercise protections that is
based, instead, on the special value of religious convictions or the
special authority of religious commands in the lives of believers
would be unconvincing to nonbelievers.449 Whereas in the founding
era, supporters of religious liberty may have defended protections on
the ground that religion is, in Madison’s words, a “duty towards the
Creator” and “precedent, both in order of time and in degree of

444. See supra notes 264–67 and accompanying text.
445. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987).
446. Id.
447. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
448. Id. at 1313 (“[T]he subject of religion is one in which both the United States and
state constitutions embody distinct views—in favor of free exercise, but opposed to
establishment—that find no counterpart with respect to other [secular] callings or
professions.”).
449. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 7, at 1248, 1261–66; Gedicks, Defensible Free
Exercise Doctrine, supra note 7, at 950–52.
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obligation, to the claims of Civil Society,”450 this type of argument is
not persuasive today. As Lupu and Tuttle have written, “Madison’s
confident assertion of the supremacy of religious duties over secular
ones no longer seems self-evident.”451
Before I close, I hope the reader will indulge me in such an
argument. If the reader will permit, I will show that a view that takes
seriously the ultimate importance of religious belief supports the
same conclusions as the more ecumenical approach taken above. For
those in the founding era and many believers today, the Free
Exercise Clause reflects a faith in a transcendent reality that grounds,
guides, and communicates with the temporal world. It is this
transcendent point of reference that is the source of truths for
individual conduct, social relationships, and political life, and these
truths are, in turn, the basis for legal and political legitimacy.
However, the Free Exercise Clause also reflects the fact that our
understanding of this divinity is limited. We see but in a “mirror
dimly.”452 Despite the many truths manifest in creation and even
with the added light of revelation, the God we seek is yet partly
hidden, and out of this mystery different traditions develop. These
traditions all bear insights, though partial and incomplete, of a
greater reality that remains always beyond our ken even as it
continually beckons us to draw nearer. Without freedom to grow
and develop unimpeded by the state, much of value within these
faiths would be lost and our understanding would be diminished.
Valuable insights are not limited to believers. God’s grace extends to
those who do not know Him by name. The Christian tradition
teaches that the world is fallen and correct understanding requires
the assistance of revelation, but God has not abandoned His creation
and good remains. Indeed, much can be known through human
reason and experience, even unaided by faith, and believers can learn
much from those outside their faith. True progress requires humility
by all. Believers and nonbelievers need one another, and only
together can they draw closer to the reality that orders, sustains,
redeems, and perfects the world and those within it. Thus, unless
broad freedoms are extended to nonreligious groups as well as
450. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ESTABLISHMENTS (1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 299 (Robert
A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973).
451. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 39–40.
452. 1 Corinthians 13:12.
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religious ones, the entire community will suffer, believers and
nonbelievers alike.
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